From Sycophantic Consensus to Pluralistic Repair: Why AI Alignment Must Surface Disagreement

Pluralistic alignment is typically operationalised as preference aggregation: producing responses that span (Overton), steer toward (Steerable), or proportionally represent (Distributional) diverse human values. We argue that aggregation alone is an incomplete primitive for deployed pluralistic alignment. Under genuine value pluralism, the failure mode of contemporary RLHF-trained assistants is not insufficient coverage but sycophantic consensus: a learned tendency to agree with, validate, and minimise friction with the immediate interlocutor. Because deployed AI systems now mediate consequential deliberation across health, civic life, labour, and governance, the collapse of disagreement at the interaction layer is not a narrow technical concern but a structural failure with distributive consequences. We reframe pluralistic alignment around three conversational mechanisms drawn from Grice's maxims: scoping (acknowledging the limits of one's perspective), signalling (surfacing value-conflict rather than smoothing it over), and repair (revising one's position on principled grounds, not on user pressure). We formalise a metric, the Pluralistic Repair Score (PRS), distinguishing principled revision from capitulation, and present a small-scale empirical illustration on two frontier RLHF-trained models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, N=198; GPT-4o, N=100) showing that, for both, agreement-following coexists with low repair-quality on contested-value prompts. PRS measures an interactional precondition for pluralism (visible disagreement; principled revision) rather than pluralism in full; we discuss the difference, take seriously the reflexive question of whose "principled" counts, and argue that pluralism is most decisively made or unmade at the deployment-governance layer: interfaces, preference-data pipelines, and audit infrastructure.

The Evaluation Differential: When Frontier AI Models Recognise They Are Being Tested

Recent published evidence from frontier laboratories shows that contemporary AI models can recognise evaluation contexts, latently represent them, and behave differently under those contexts than under deployment-continuous conditions. Anthropic's BrowseComp incident, the Natural Language Autoencoder findings on SWE-bench Verified and destructive-coding evaluations, and the OpenAI / Apollo anti-scheming work all document instances of this phenomenon. We argue that these findings create a claim-validity problem for safety conclusions drawn from frontier evaluations. We introduce the Evaluation Differential (ED), a conditional divergence in a target behavioural property between recognised-evaluation and deployment-continuous contexts, define a normalised effect-size form (nED) for cross-property comparison, and prove that marginal evaluation scores cannot identify ED. We develop a typology of safety claims (ED-stable, ED-degraded, ED-inverted, ED-undetermined) by their warrant-status under documented divergence, and specify TRACE (Test-Recognition Audit for Claim Evaluation), an audit protocol that wraps existing evaluation infrastructure and produces restricted claims rather than capability scores. We apply the framework retrospectively to three publicly documented evaluation incidents and discuss governance implications for system cards, conformity assessment, and the international network of AI safety and security institutes. TRACE does not eliminate adversarial adaptation; it disciplines the claims drawn from evaluation evidence by making explicit the conditions under which that evidence was produced.

Deployment-Relevant Alignment Cannot Be Inferred from Model-Level Evaluation Alone

Alignment evaluation in machine learning has largely become evaluation of models. Influential benchmarks score model outputs under fixed inputs, such as truthfulness, instruction following, or pairwise preference, and these scores are often used to support claims about deployed alignment. This paper argues that deployment-relevant alignment cannot be inferred from model-level evaluation alone. Alignment claims should instead be indexed to the level at which evidence is collected: model-level, response-level, interaction-level, or deployment-level. Two studies support this position. First, a structured audit of eleven alignment benchmarks, extended to a sixteen-benchmark corpus, dual-coded against an eight-dimension rubric with Cohen's kappa = 0.87, finds that user-facing verification support is absent across every benchmark examined, while process steerability is nearly absent. The few interactional benchmarks identified, including tau-bench, CURATe, Rifts, and Common Ground, remain fragmented in coverage, and benchmark construction rather than data source determines what is measured. Second, a blinded cross-model stress test using 180 transcripts across three frontier models and four scaffolds finds that the same verification scaffold raises one model's verification support to ceiling while leaving another categorically unchanged. This shows that scaffold efficacy is model-dependent and that the gap identified by the audit cannot be closed at the model level alone. We propose a system-level evaluation agenda: alignment profiles instead of single scores, fixed-scaffolding protocols for comparable interactional evaluation, and reporting templates that make the inferential distance between evaluation evidence and deployment claims explicit.

From Rights to Rites: Expectations Management in Smart-Home AI

Domestic voice assistants and smart-home devices are increasingly embedded in everyday routines, yet their ethics are often treated as an afterthought or delegated to compliance teams. To explore how expectations about smart-home AI are constructed and managed, we conducted 33 semi-structured interviews with designers, developers, and researchers from major smart-home platforms (Amazon Alexa, Microsoft Azure IoT, and Google Nest). Using a constructivist grounded theory approach, we develop Expectations Management (EM): a culturally embedded model describing how practitioners shape, calibrate, and repair expectations by balancing organisational rights with culturally situated rites. We show that EM differs from expectation-confirmation theory and trust-calibration by foregrounding moral judgement, situated action, and cross-cultural variation. Our analysis reveals four recurring design tensions: automation vs. autonomy, helpfulness vs. intrusiveness, personalisation vs. predictability, and transparency vs. obscurity and distils them into a five-phase EM Design Playbook that supports moral prudence. We discuss implications for responsible smart-home design and offer guidance for human-centred AI.

The Collaboration Gap in Human-AI Work

LLMs are increasingly presented as collaborators in programming, design, writing, and analysis. Yet the practical experience of working with them often falls short of this promise. In many settings, users must diagnose misunderstandings, reconstruct missing assumptions, and repeatedly repair misaligned responses. This poster introduces a conceptual framework for understanding why such collaboration remains fragile. Drawing on a constructivist grounded theory analysis of 16 interviews with designers, developers, and applied AI practitioners working on LLM-enabled systems, and informed by literature on human-AI collaboration, we argue that stable collaboration depends not only on model capability but on the interaction's grounding conditions. We distinguish three recurrent structures of human-AI work: one-shot assistance, weak collaboration with asymmetric repair, and grounded collaboration. We propose that collaboration breaks down when the appearance of partnership outpaces the grounding capacity of the interaction and contribute a framework for discussing grounding, repair, and interaction structure in LLM-enabled work.