Cooperate to Compete: Strategic Data Generation and Incentivization Framework for Coopetitive Cross-Silo Federated Learning

In data-sensitive domains such as healthcare, cross-silo federated learning (CFL) allows organizations to collaboratively train AI models without sharing raw data. However, practical CFL deployments are inherently coopetitive, in which organizations cooperate during model training while competing in downstream markets. In such settings, training contributions, including data volume, quality, and diversity, can improve the global model yet inadvertently strengthen rivals. This dilemma is amplified by non-IID data, which leads to asymmetric learning gains and undermines sustained participation. While existing competition-aware CFL and incentive-design approaches reward organizations based on marginal training contributions, they fail to account for the costs of strengthening competitors. In this paper, we introduce CoCoGen+, a coopetition-compatible data generation and incentivization framework that jointly models non-IID data and inter-organizational competition while endogenizing GenAI-based synthetic data generation as a strategic decision. Specifically, CoCoGen+ formulates each training round as a weighted potential game, where organizations strategically decide how much synthetic data to generate by balancing learning performance gains against computational costs and competition-caused utility losses. We then provide a tractable equilibrium characterization and derive implementable generation strategies to maximize social welfare. To promote long-term collaboration, we integrate a payoff redistribution-based incentive mechanism to compensate organizations for their contributions and competition-caused utility degradation. Experiments on varying learning tasks validate the feasibility of CoCoGen+. The results show how non-IID data, competition intensity, and incentives shape organizational strategies and social welfare, while CoCoGen+ outperforms baselines in efficiency.

Towards Verifiable Federated Unlearning: Framework, Challenges, and The Road Ahead

Federated unlearning (FUL) enables removing the data influence from the model trained across distributed clients, upholding the right to be forgotten as mandated by privacy regulations. FUL facilitates a value exchange where clients gain privacy-preserving control over their data contributions, while service providers leverage decentralized computing and data freshness. However, this entire proposition is undermined because clients have no reliable way to verify that their data influence has been provably removed, as current metrics and simple notifications offer insufficient assurance. We envision unlearning verification becoming a pivotal and trust-by-design part of the FUL life-cycle development, essential for highly regulated and data-sensitive services and applications like healthcare. This article introduces veriFUL, a reference framework for verifiable FUL that formalizes verification entities, goals, approaches, and metrics. Specifically, we consolidate existing efforts and contribute new insights, concepts, and metrics to this domain. Finally, we highlight research challenges and identify potential applications and developments for verifiable FUL and veriFUL.

Right Reward Right Time for Federated Learning

Critical learning periods (CLPs) in federated learning (FL) refer to early stages during which low-quality contributions (e.g., sparse training data availability) can permanently impair the learning performance of the global model owned by the model owner (i.e., the cloud server). However, strategies to motivate clients with high-quality contributions to join the FL training process and share trained model updates during CLPs remain underexplored. Additionally, existing incentive mechanisms in FL treat all training periods equally, which consequently fails to motivate clients to participate early. Compounding this challenge is the cloud's limited knowledge of client training capabilities due to privacy regulations, leading to information asymmetry. Therefore, in this article, we propose a time-aware incentive mechanism, called Right Reward Right Time (R3T), to encourage client involvement, especially during CLPs, to maximize the utility of the cloud in FL. Specifically, the cloud utility function captures the trade-off between the achieved model performance and payments allocated for clients' contributions, while accounting for clients' time and system capabilities, efforts, joining time, and rewards. Then, we analytically derive the optimal contract for the cloud and devise a CLP-aware mechanism to incentivize early participation and efforts while maximizing cloud utility, even under information asymmetry. By providing the right reward at the right time, our approach can attract the highest-quality contributions during CLPs. Simulation and proof-of-concept studies show that R3T increases cloud utility and is more economically effective than benchmarks. Notably, our proof-of-concept results show up to a 47.6% reduction in the total number of clients and up to a 300% improvement in convergence time while reaching competitive test accuracies compared with incentive mechanism benchmarks.