U-CFR: Uncertainty-Guided Cascade Forward Refinement for Interactive Segmentation

Interactive image segmentation is critical for efficient image annotation; however, existing methods often require many corrective clicks or rely on passive refinement schemes that converge slowly. We propose Uncertainty-Guided Cascade Forward Refinement (U-CFR), a novel inference-time framework that enables models to autonomously self-correct after each user interaction. U-CFR introduces a boundary-aware uncertainty score that fuses segmentation uncertainty, contour gradients, and explicit edge predictions to guide the placement of internal pseudo-clicks. These self-generated clicks target the most ambiguous boundary regions, providing strong corrective signals without additional manual input. To support this process, we design a dual-head network with a shared encoder-decoder backbone: a segmentation head ensures region consistency, while an edge head sharpens boundary alignment. In inference, U-CFR launches a cascade of refinement steps, where each stage leverages the uncertainty-driven pseudo-clicks to refine the mask progressively. Experiments on standard benchmark datasets demonstrate that the proposed U-CFR improves click efficiency, initial mask quality, and boundary accuracy. It reduces the required clicks by over 10% on challenging datasets like Berkeley and offers a more intelligent and efficient interactive annotation.

Intentional Deception as Controllable Capability in LLM Agents

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.