Scaffold Effects on GAIA: A Controlled Comparison

Published agent capability scores conflate what a model can do with what its scaffold lets it do, and the magnitude of this elicitation gap is not well characterized under controlled conditions. This study executes a pre-registered controlled comparison of three scaffolds (ReAct, a Planner-Actor-Rater multi-agent design, and planner-then-executor) across five models from three providers (Claude Opus 4.7, Sonnet 4.6, Haiku 4.5; Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview; GPT-5.5) on GAIA validation Levels 1 and 2, holding tasks and conditions fixed, with three attempts per question. Scaffold choice alone moves measured accuracy by as much as 28 percentage points within a single model (Opus, Level 2, robust slice), confirming the pre-registered hypothesis that scaffold variation produces gaps of at least 10 points. The pre-registered prediction that more capable models would be less scaffold-sensitive is rejected in direction: scaffold effects vary significantly by model in every dataset slice, but the most capable Anthropic model gains the most from structured scaffolds at the harder level, and tier-scaling holds only at Level 1 under the robust slice. The multi-agent advantage over ReAct at Level 2 appears within the Anthropic family but not for the cross-provider models, making model family rather than capability tier the conditioning variable, and the predicted planner-executor advantage on file-reading tasks is falsified. Structured scaffolds make fewer tool calls yet recover more often from mid-trajectory errors at the harder level, and a single cell (Gemini with planner-then-executor) is the cheapest at both levels and the most accurate at Level 2. These results indicate that single-scaffold capability numbers are scaffold-conditional estimates and that the elicitation gap is not guaranteed to shrink as models improve.

Intentional Deception as Controllable Capability in LLM Agents

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.