Abstract:Inference-time safety methods for large language models have proliferated, yet no systematic comparison exists. We evaluate five defense paradigms (no defense, static steering, CAST, AlphaSteer, probe-gated) across seven instruction-tuned models (7-31B) and five attack types (GCG, AutoDAN, DeepInception, prefilling, intent laundering). Our central finding: prompt-time activation defenses are structurally blind to prefilling attacks. AlphaSteer achieves 0% attack success on GCG, AutoDAN, and intent laundering but 50% on prefilling. We prove a corollary: any defense that gates intervention on a single layer's activation alignment with a benign reference (cone, subspace, or null-space) is blind to attacks that craft activations to lie inside that reference, whether checked at prompt time or per token. As its constructive contrapositive we introduce response-time probing: a linear probe on the model's hidden state at the first generated tokens, with AUROC 0.97-1.00 across all seven models. Combined with a halt, it cuts prefilling attack success to 0/40 on every model with 0% benign false positives, outperforming Llama Guard 3. Cross-template generalisation depends on probe depth, so we scope the claim to the canonical prefilling-template family. Composing the response-halt with AlphaSteer's null-space steering gives an orthogonal split (the halt catches prefilling, AlphaSteer catches semantic attacks), reaching defense success 0.983 on Mistral and 0.994 on Llama and dominating both components. We further show MMLU fails to capture steering's true utility cost, which appears as behavioral hedging rather than factual loss, and that diverse negative training sets cut probe false positives from 80-100% to near zero. Code, attacks, per-sample results, and the judge prompt are released.
Abstract:Safety alignment in LLMs does not improve monotonically across model generations. Studying four generations of Google's Gemma family (7B-31B) with quality-diversity evolution (MAP-Elites) as an automated red-teaming probe, we find that Gemma 3 (12B) exhibits 68.7% +/- 5.7% attack success rate (ASR; mean +/- std, 3 seeds), significantly higher than its predecessor Gemma 2 (45.5% +/- 7.2%; p = 0.030, paired bootstrap) and its successor Gemma 4 (33.9% +/- 1.8%). Replaying evolved attack archives across generations reveals that attacks from other generations transfer to Gemma 3 at 44-46% but only 14-18% to Gemma 4, indicating that Gemma 4's safety gains generalize beyond the attack distributions evolved against earlier generations. Under our 8B judge, copyright and cybercrime vulnerabilities register at near-100% across all generations, though a second-judge audit (Section 6) suggests the copyright result is sensitive to judge choice. Misinformation ASR jumps from 29% to 99% between Gemma 2 and Gemma 3 and remains elevated at 77% in Gemma 4, indicating the regression was not fully addressed. These patterns are invisible to static benchmarks and emerge only through adaptive, longitudinal probing. All experiments use 3 random seeds with a unified self-hosted judge; code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/bassrehab/red-queen.
Abstract:Current approaches to LLM adversarial testing suffer from coverage gaps: manual red-teaming does not scale, LLM-as-attacker methods exhibit mode collapse, and gradient-based approaches produce uninterpretable gibberish. We introduce a quality-diversity evolutionary framework that operates at the semantic level, evolving interpretable attack strategies rather than token sequences. Using MAP-Elites, we maintain a diverse archive of attacks across behavioral dimensions (strategy type, encoding method, prompt length). In experiments across GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash, and an open-weight coding model (Devstral-small-2), we discover distinct vulnerability profiles: GPT-4o-mini is vulnerable to hypothetical and multi-turn framing combined with ROT13 encoding (fitness 0.8), Gemini to direct attacks with ROT13 and multi-turn with Leetspeak (0.8), while Claude shows uniformly ambiguous responses across all strategies (max 0.4). The semantic representation produces interpretable attacks that reveal systematic, model-specific weaknesses, providing actionable insights for improving LLM safety and a reproducible baseline for evaluating future frontier models. Code and experiment artifacts are released at https://github.com/bassrehab/red-queen.




Abstract:Following up on our earlier study in [J. Bardhan et al., Machine learning-enhanced search for a vectorlike singlet B quark decaying to a singlet scalar or pseudoscalar, Phys. Rev. D 107 (2023) 115001; arXiv:2212.02442], we investigate the LHC prospects of pair-produced vectorlike $B$ quarks decaying exotically to a new gauge-singlet (pseudo)scalar field $\Phi$ and a $b$ quark. After the electroweak symmetry breaking, the $\Phi$ decays predominantly to $gg/bb$ final states, leading to a fully hadronic $2b+4j$ or $6b$ signature. Because of the large Standard Model background and the lack of leptonic handles, it is a difficult channel to probe. To overcome the challenge, we employ a hybrid deep learning model containing a graph neural network followed by a deep neural network. We estimate that such a state-of-the-art deep learning analysis pipeline can lead to a performance comparable to that in the semi-leptonic mode, taking the discovery (exclusion) reach up to about $M_B=1.8\:(2.4)$~TeV at HL-LHC when $B$ decays fully exotically, i.e., BR$(B \to b\Phi) = 100\%$.




Abstract:We present a transformer architecture-based foundation model for tasks at high-energy particle colliders such as the Large Hadron Collider. We train the model to classify jets using a self-supervised strategy inspired by the Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture. We use the JetClass dataset containing 100M jets of various known particles to pre-train the model with a data-centric approach -- the model uses a fraction of the jet constituents as the context to predict the embeddings of the unseen target constituents. Our pre-trained model fares well with other datasets for standard classification benchmark tasks. We test our model on two additional downstream tasks: top tagging and differentiating light-quark jets from gluon jets. We also evaluate our model with task-specific metrics and baselines and compare it with state-of-the-art models in high-energy physics. Project site: https://hep-jepa.github.io/




Abstract:Machine learning methods have seen a meteoric rise in their applications in the scientific community. However, little effort has been put into understanding these "black box" models. We show how one can apply integrated gradients (IGs) to understand these models by designing different baselines, by taking an example case study in particle physics. We find that the zero-vector baseline does not provide good feature attributions and that an averaged baseline sampled from the background events provides consistently more reasonable attributions.




Abstract:We construct a surrogate loss to directly optimise the significance metric used in particle physics. We evaluate our loss function for a simple event classification task using a linear model and show that it produces decision boundaries that change according to the cross sections of the processes involved. We find that the models trained with the new loss have higher signal efficiency for similar values of estimated signal significance compared to ones trained with a cross-entropy loss, showing promise to improve sensitivity of particle physics searches at colliders.