Do Models Share Safety Representations? Cross-Model Steering for Safe Visual Generation

Recent progress in generative modeling has made safety control a central challenge, yet existing approaches remain largely model-specific, requiring retraining or tailored interventions for each new architecture. In this work, we ask whether safety can be represented as a portable latent direction, learned once and reused across heterogeneous generators. We introduce the first framework for cross-model safety steering, in which a safety direction is estimated in a source LLM from paired safe-unsafe prompts, transported to a target generator through a lightweight alignment fitted on benign data alone, and applied at inference time. Crucially, our pipeline never accesses unsafe data on the target side, isolating whether safety can be transferred through shared representation geometry. Beyond a single global direction, we also identify a multi-vector extension that captures category-specific safety behaviors, enabling more selective control. We evaluate our approach in text-to-image and text-to-video generation across diverse source-target model pairs. Across models, transferred safety directions achieve ASR reduction and CLIP-Score/FID trade-offs comparable to directions learned natively on the target model using unsafe data, while requiring no target-side unsafe data. This indicates that safety improvements do not come at the expense of generation quality. Our results point to a modular view of safety: safety-relevant behavior is not purely model-local, but can be controlled through latent directions that persist across models. This suggests a new path toward lightweight, reusable safety mechanisms that do not require target-side unsafe data.

Improving LLM First-Token Predictions in Multiple-Choice Question Answering via Prefilling Attack

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated on multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) tasks using *first-token probability* (FTP), which selects the answer option whose initial token has the highest likelihood. While efficient, FTP can be fragile: models may assign high probability to unrelated tokens (*misalignment*) or use a valid token merely as part of a generic preamble rather than as a clear answer choice (*misinterpretation*), undermining the reliability of symbolic evaluation. We propose a simple solution: the *prefilling attack*, a structured natural-language prefix (e.g., "*The correct option is:*") prepended to the model output. Originally explored in AI safety, we repurpose prefilling to steer the model to respond with a clean, valid option, without modifying its parameters. Empirically, the FTP with prefilling strategy substantially improves accuracy, calibration, and output consistency across a broad set of LLMs and MCQA benchmarks. It outperforms standard FTP and often matches the performance of open-ended generation approaches that require full decoding and external classifiers, while being significantly more efficient. Our findings suggest that prefilling is a simple, robust, and low-cost method to enhance the reliability of FTP-based evaluation in multiple-choice settings.