Peer-Aware Cost Estimation in Nonlinear General-Sum Dynamic Games for Mutual Learning and Intent Inference

Human-robot interactions can be modeled as incomplete-information general-sum dynamic games since the objective functions of both agents are not explicitly known to each other. However, solving for equilibrium policies for such games presents a major challenge, especially if the games involve nonlinear underlying dynamics. To simplify the problem, existing work often assumes that one agent is an expert with complete information about its peer, which can lead to biased estimates and failures in coordination. To address this challenge, we propose a nonlinear peer-aware cost estimation (N-PACE) algorithm for general-sum dynamic games. In N-PACE, using iterative linear quadratic (LQ) approximation of the nonlinear general-sum game, each agent explicitly models the learning dynamics of its peer agent while inferring their objective functions, leading to unbiased fast learning in inferring the unknown objective function of the peer agent, which is critical for task completion and safety assurance. Additionally, we demonstrate how N-PACE enables \textbf{intent communication} in such multi-agent systems by explicitly modeling the peer's learning dynamics.

PACE: A Framework for Learning and Control in Linear Incomplete-Information Differential Games

In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for solving general-sum differential games. While solutions to such linear differential games are typically obtained through coupled Riccati equations, the complexity increases when agents have incomplete information, particularly when neither is aware of the other's cost function. To tackle this challenge, we propose a model-based Peer-Aware Cost Estimation (PACE) framework for learning the cost parameters of the other agent. In PACE, each agent treats its peer as a learning agent rather than a stationary optimal agent, models their learning dynamics, and leverages this dynamic to infer the cost function parameters of the other agent. This approach enables agents to infer each other's objective function in real time based solely on their previous state observations and dynamically adapt their control policies. Furthermore, we provide a theoretical guarantee for the convergence of parameter estimation and the stability of system states in PACE. Additionally, in our numerical studies, we demonstrate how modeling the learning dynamics of the other agent benefits PACE, compared to approaches that approximate the other agent as having complete information, particularly in terms of stability and convergence speed.