Abstract:This paper investigates the performance of networked control systems subject to multiplicative routing transformations that alter measurement pathways without directly injecting signals. Such transformations, arising from faults or adversarial actions, modify the feedback structure and can degrade performance while remaining stealthy. An $H_2$-norm framework is proposed to quantify the impact of these transformations by evaluating the ratio between the steady-state energies of performance and residual outputs. Equivalent linear matrix inequality (LMI) formulations are derived for computational assessment, and analytical upper bounds are established to estimate the worst-case degradation. The results provide structural insight into how routing manipulations influence closed-loop behavior and reveal conditions for stealthy multiplicative attacks.
Abstract:Networked control systems (NCSs) are vulnerable to faults and hidden malfunctions in communication channels that can degrade performance or even destabilize the closed loop. Classical metrics in robust control and fault detection typically treat impact and detectability separately, whereas the output-to-output gain (OOG) provides a unified measure of both. While existing results have been limited to linear systems, this paper extends the OOG framework to nonlinear NCSs with quadratically constrained nonlinearities, considering false-injection attacks that can also manipulate sensor measurements through nonlinear transformations. Specifically, we provide computationally efficient linear matrix inequality conditions and complementary frequency-domain tests that yield explicit upper bounds on the OOG of this class of nonlinear systems. Furthermore, we derive frequency-domain conditions for absolute stability of closed-loop systems, generalizing the Yakubovich quadratic criterion.