Alignment Defends LLMs from Property Inference Attacks

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly fine-tuned on domain-specific datasets that may contain sensitive, dataset-level properties. Recent work has shown that such dataset-level information can be effectively extracted through property inference attacks, posing a confidentiality risk. Existing defenses against these attacks primarily operate by modifying the training data distribution and hence require access to the original data and retraining the model, limiting their applicability to settings where data is unavailable or models are already deployed. In this work, we propose alignment-based defenses for mitigating property inference attacks in LLMs. Our approach reshapes the model's output distribution towards a target property ratio via post-training alignment, without modifying the training data. In particular, we adapt two widely used RLHF frameworks--Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO)--as our defenses by constructing preference pairs and defining a specific reward function respectively. Through comprehensive experiments, we show that our alignment based defenses effectively mitigate property inference attacks while maintaining a strong utility confidentiality tradeoff.

Better Membership Inference Privacy Measurement through Discrepancy

Membership Inference Attacks have emerged as a dominant method for empirically measuring privacy leakage from machine learning models. Here, privacy is measured by the {\em{advantage}} or gap between a score or a function computed on the training and the test data. A major barrier to the practical deployment of these attacks is that they do not scale to large well-generalized models -- either the advantage is relatively low, or the attack involves training multiple models which is highly compute-intensive. In this work, inspired by discrepancy theory, we propose a new empirical privacy metric that is an upper bound on the advantage of a family of membership inference attacks. We show that this metric does not involve training multiple models, can be applied to large Imagenet classification models in-the-wild, and has higher advantage than existing metrics on models trained with more recent and sophisticated training recipes. Motivated by our empirical results, we also propose new membership inference attacks tailored to these training losses.