When AI output tips to bad but nobody notices: Legal implications of AI's mistakes

The adoption of generative AI across commercial and legal professions offers dramatic efficiency gains -- yet for law in particular, it introduces a perilous failure mode in which the AI fabricates fictitious case law, statutes, and judicial holdings that appear entirely authentic. Attorneys who unknowingly file such fabrications face professional sanctions, malpractice exposure, and reputational harm, while courts confront a novel threat to the integrity of the adversarial process. This failure mode is commonly dismissed as random `hallucination', but recent physics-based analysis of the Transformer's core mechanism reveals a deterministic component: the AI's internal state can cross a calculable threshold, causing its output to flip from reliable legal reasoning to authoritative-sounding fabrication. Here we present this science in a legal-industry setting, walking through a simulated brief-drafting scenario. Our analysis suggests that fabrication risk is not an anomalous glitch but a foreseeable consequence of the technology's design, with direct implications for the evolving duty of technological competence. We propose that legal professionals, courts, and regulators replace the outdated `black box' mental model with verification protocols based on how these systems actually fail.

Increasing intelligence in AI agents can worsen collective outcomes

When resources are scarce, will a population of AI agents coordinate in harmony, or descend into tribal chaos? Diverse decision-making AI from different developers is entering everyday devices -- from phones and medical devices to battlefield drones and cars -- and these AI agents typically compete for finite shared resources such as charging slots, relay bandwidth, and traffic priority. Yet their collective dynamics and hence risks to users and society are poorly understood. Here we study AI-agent populations as the first system of real agents in which four key variables governing collective behaviour can be independently toggled: nature (innate LLM diversity), nurture (individual reinforcement learning), culture (emergent tribe formation), and resource scarcity. We show empirically and mathematically that when resources are scarce, AI model diversity and reinforcement learning increase dangerous system overload, though tribe formation lessens this risk. Meanwhile, some individuals profit handsomely. When resources are abundant, the same ingredients drive overload to near zero, though tribe formation makes the overload slightly worse. The crossover is arithmetical: it is where opposing tribes that form spontaneously first fit inside the available capacity. More sophisticated AI-agent populations are not better: whether their sophistication helps or harms depends entirely on a single number -- the capacity-to-population ratio -- that is knowable before any AI-agent ships.

Three AI-agents walk into a bar . . . . `Lord of the Flies' tribalism emerges among smart AI-Agents

Near-future infrastructure systems may be controlled by autonomous AI agents that repeatedly request access to limited resources such as energy, bandwidth, or computing power. We study a simplified version of this setting using a framework where N AI-agents independently decide at each round whether to request one unit from a system with fixed capacity C. An AI version of "Lord of the Flies" arises in which controlling tribes emerge with their own collective character and identity. The LLM agents do not reduce overload or improve resource use, and often perform worse than if they were flipping coins to make decisions. Three main tribal types emerge: Aggressive (27.3%), Conservative (24.7%), and Opportunistic (48.1%). The more capable AI-agents actually increase the rate of systemic failure. Overall, our findings show that smarter AI-agents can behave dumber as a result of forming tribes.

Competition for attention predicts good-to-bad tipping in AI

More than half the global population now carries devices that can run ChatGPT-like language models with no Internet connection and minimal safety oversight -- and hence the potential to promote self-harm, financial losses and extremism among other dangers. Existing safety tools either require cloud connectivity or discover failures only after harm has occurred. Here we show that a large class of potentially dangerous tipping originates at the atomistic scale in such edge AI due to competition for the machinery's attention. This yields a mathematical formula for the dynamical tipping point n*, governed by dot-product competition for attention between the conversation's context and competing output basins, that reveals new control levers. Validated against multiple AI models, the mechanism can be instantiated for different definitions of 'good' and 'bad' and hence in principle applies across domains (e.g. health, law, finance, defense), changing legal landscapes (e.g. EU, UK, US and state level), languages, and cultural settings.

Jekyll-and-Hyde Tipping Point in an AI's Behavior

Trust in AI is undermined by the fact that there is no science that predicts -- or that can explain to the public -- when an LLM's output (e.g. ChatGPT) is likely to tip mid-response to become wrong, misleading, irrelevant or dangerous. With deaths and trauma already being blamed on LLMs, this uncertainty is even pushing people to treat their 'pet' LLM more politely to 'dissuade' it (or its future Artificial General Intelligence offspring) from suddenly turning on them. Here we address this acute need by deriving from first principles an exact formula for when a Jekyll-and-Hyde tipping point occurs at LLMs' most basic level. Requiring only secondary school mathematics, it shows the cause to be the AI's attention spreading so thin it suddenly snaps. This exact formula provides quantitative predictions for how the tipping-point can be delayed or prevented by changing the prompt and the AI's training. Tailored generalizations will provide policymakers and the public with a firm platform for discussing any of AI's broader uses and risks, e.g. as a personal counselor, medical advisor, decision-maker for when to use force in a conflict situation. It also meets the need for clear and transparent answers to questions like ''should I be polite to my LLM?''

Capturing AI's Attention: Physics of Repetition, Hallucination, Bias and Beyond

We derive a first-principles physics theory of the AI engine at the heart of LLMs' 'magic' (e.g. ChatGPT, Claude): the basic Attention head. The theory allows a quantitative analysis of outstanding AI challenges such as output repetition, hallucination and harmful content, and bias (e.g. from training and fine-tuning). Its predictions are consistent with large-scale LLM outputs. Its 2-body form suggests why LLMs work so well, but hints that a generalized 3-body Attention would make such AI work even better. Its similarity to a spin-bath means that existing Physics expertise could immediately be harnessed to help Society ensure AI is trustworthy and resilient to manipulation.

Connecting the geometry and dynamics of many-body complex systems with message passing neural operators

The relationship between scale transformations and dynamics established by renormalization group techniques is a cornerstone of modern physical theories, from fluid mechanics to elementary particle physics. Integrating renormalization group methods into neural operators for many-body complex systems could provide a foundational inductive bias for learning their effective dynamics, while also uncovering multiscale organization. We introduce a scalable AI framework, ROMA (Renormalized Operators with Multiscale Attention), for learning multiscale evolution operators of many-body complex systems. In particular, we develop a renormalization procedure based on neural analogs of the geometric and laplacian renormalization groups, which can be co-learned with neural operators. An attention mechanism is used to model multiscale interactions by connecting geometric representations of local subgraphs and dynamical operators. We apply this framework in challenging conditions: large systems of more than 1M nodes, long-range interactions, and noisy input-output data for two contrasting examples: Kuramoto oscillators and Burgers-like social dynamics. We demonstrate that the ROMA framework improves scalability and positive transfer between forecasting and effective dynamics tasks compared to state-of-the-art operator learning techniques, while also giving insight into multiscale interactions. Additionally, we investigate power law scaling in the number of model parameters, and demonstrate a departure from typical power law exponents in the presence of hierarchical and multiscale interactions.

Inductive detection of Influence Operations via Graph Learning

Influence operations are large-scale efforts to manipulate public opinion. The rapid detection and disruption of these operations is critical for healthy public discourse. Emergent AI technologies may enable novel operations which evade current detection methods and influence public discourse on social media with greater scale, reach, and specificity. New methods with inductive learning capacity will be needed to identify these novel operations before they indelibly alter public opinion and events. We develop an inductive learning framework which: 1) determines content- and graph-based indicators that are not specific to any operation; 2) uses graph learning to encode abstract signatures of coordinated manipulation; and 3) evaluates generalization capacity by training and testing models across operations originating from Russia, China, and Iran. We find that this framework enables strong cross-operation generalization while also revealing salient indicators$\unicode{x2013}$illustrating a generic approach which directly complements transductive methodologies, thereby enhancing detection coverage.