Data-Augmented Game Starts for Accelerating Self-Play Exploration in Imperfect Information Games

Finding approximate equilibria for large-scale imperfect-information competitive games such as StarCraft, Dota, and CounterStrike remains computationally infeasible due to sparse rewards and challenging exploration over long horizons. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent starting-state sampling strategy designed to substantially accelerate online exploration in regularized policy-gradient game methods for two-player zero-sum (2p0s) games. Motivated by an assumption that offline demonstrations from skilled humans can provide good coverage of high-level strategies relevant to equilibrium play, we propose the initialization of reinforcement learning data collection at intermediate states sampled from offline data to facilitate exploration of strategically relevant subgames. Referring to this method as Data-Augmented Game Starts (DAGS), we perform experiments using synthetic datasets and analytically tractable, long-horizon control variants of two-player Kuhn Poker, Goofspiel, and a counterexample game designed to penalize biased beliefs over hidden information. Under fixed computational budgets, DAGS enables regularized policy gradient methods to achieve lower exploitability in games with significantly more challenging exploration. We show that augmenting starting state distributions when solving imperfect information games can lead to biased equilibria, and we provide a straightforward mitigation to this in the form of multi-task observation flags. Finally, we release a new set of benchmark environments that drastically increase exploration challenges and state counts in existing OpenSpiel games while keeping exploitability measurements analytically tractable.

An Optimisation Framework for Unsupervised Environment Design

For reinforcement learning agents to be deployed in high-risk settings, they must achieve a high level of robustness to unfamiliar scenarios. One method for improving robustness is unsupervised environment design (UED), a suite of methods aiming to maximise an agent's generalisability across configurations of an environment. In this work, we study UED from an optimisation perspective, providing stronger theoretical guarantees for practical settings than prior work. Whereas previous methods relied on guarantees if they reach convergence, our framework employs a nonconvex-strongly-concave objective for which we provide a provably convergent algorithm in the zero-sum setting. We empirically verify the efficacy of our method, outperforming prior methods in a number of environments with varying difficulties.