Selective Perception: Optimizing State Descriptions with Reinforcement Learning for Language Model Actors

Large language models (LLMs) are being applied as actors for sequential decision making tasks in domains such as robotics and games, utilizing their general world knowledge and planning abilities. However, previous work does little to explore what environment state information is provided to LLM actors via language. Exhaustively describing high-dimensional states can impair performance and raise inference costs for LLM actors. Previous LLM actors avoid the issue by relying on hand-engineered, task-specific protocols to determine which features to communicate about a state and which to leave out. In this work, we propose Brief Language INputs for DEcision-making Responses (BLINDER), a method for automatically selecting concise state descriptions by learning a value function for task-conditioned state descriptions. We evaluate BLINDER on the challenging video game NetHack and a robotic manipulation task. Our method improves task success rate, reduces input size and compute costs, and generalizes between LLM actors.

Feasible Adversarial Robust Reinforcement Learning for Underspecified Environments

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) considers the problem of learning policies that perform well in the worst case among a set of possible environment parameter values. In real-world environments, choosing the set of possible values for robust RL can be a difficult task. When that set is specified too narrowly, the agent will be left vulnerable to reasonable parameter values unaccounted for. When specified too broadly, the agent will be too cautious. In this paper, we propose Feasible Adversarial Robust RL (FARR), a method for automatically determining the set of environment parameter values over which to be robust. FARR implicitly defines the set of feasible parameter values as those on which an agent could achieve a benchmark reward given enough training resources. By formulating this problem as a two-player zero-sum game, FARR jointly learns an adversarial distribution over parameter values with feasible support and a policy robust over this feasible parameter set. Using the PSRO algorithm to find an approximate Nash equilibrium in this FARR game, we show that an agent trained with FARR is more robust to feasible adversarial parameter selection than with existing minimax, domain-randomization, and regret objectives in a parameterized gridworld and three MuJoCo control environments.

Self-Play PSRO: Toward Optimal Populations in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

In competitive two-agent environments, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods based on the \emph{Double Oracle (DO)} algorithm, such as \emph{Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO)} and \emph{Anytime PSRO (APSRO)}, iteratively add RL best response policies to a population. Eventually, an optimal mixture of these population policies will approximate a Nash equilibrium. However, these methods might need to add all deterministic policies before converging. In this work, we introduce \emph{Self-Play PSRO (SP-PSRO)}, a method that adds an approximately optimal stochastic policy to the population in each iteration. Instead of adding only deterministic best responses to the opponent's least exploitable population mixture, SP-PSRO also learns an approximately optimal stochastic policy and adds it to the population as well. As a result, SP-PSRO empirically tends to converge much faster than APSRO and in many games converges in just a few iterations.