Interpreting Deepcode, a learned feedback code

Deep learning methods have recently been used to construct non-linear codes for the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with feedback. However, there is limited understanding of how these black-box-like codes with many learned parameters use feedback. This study aims to uncover the fundamental principles underlying the first deep-learned feedback code, known as Deepcode, which is based on an RNN architecture. Our interpretable model based on Deepcode is built by analyzing the influence length of inputs and approximating the non-linear dynamics of the original black-box RNN encoder. Numerical experiments demonstrate that our interpretable model -- which includes both an encoder and a decoder -- achieves comparable performance to Deepcode while offering an interpretation of how it employs feedback for error correction.

Active learning for fast and slow modeling attacks on Arbiter PUFs

Modeling attacks, in which an adversary uses machine learning techniques to model a hardware-based Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) pose a great threat to the viability of these hardware security primitives. In most modeling attacks, a random subset of challenge-response-pairs (CRPs) are used as the labeled data for the machine learning algorithm. Here, for the arbiter-PUF, a delay based PUF which may be viewed as a linear threshold function with random weights (due to manufacturing imperfections), we investigate the role of active learning in Support Vector Machine (SVM) learning. We focus on challenge selection to help SVM algorithm learn ``fast'' and learn ``slow''. Our methods construct challenges rather than relying on a sample pool of challenges as in prior work. Using active learning to learn ``fast'' (less CRPs revealed, higher accuracies) may help manufacturers learn the manufactured PUFs more efficiently, or may form a more powerful attack when the attacker may query the PUF for CRPs at will. Using active learning to select challenges from which learning is ``slow'' (low accuracy despite a large number of revealed CRPs) may provide a basis for slowing down attackers who are limited to overhearing CRPs.