Implicit Intelligence -- Evaluating Agents on What Users Don't Say

Real-world requests to AI agents are fundamentally underspecified. Natural human communication relies on shared context and unstated constraints that speakers expect listeners to infer. Current agentic benchmarks test explicit instruction-following but fail to evaluate whether agents can reason about implicit requirements spanning accessibility needs, privacy boundaries, catastrophic risks, and contextual constraints. We present Implicit Intelligence, an evaluation framework testing whether AI agents can move beyond prompt-following to become genuine goal-fulfillers, paired with Agent-as-a-World (AaW), a harness where interactive worlds are defined in human-readable YAML files and simulated by language models. Our scenarios feature apparent simplicity in user requests, hidden complexity in correct solutions, and discoverability of constraints through environmental exploration. Evaluating 16 frontier and open-weight models across 205 scenarios, we find that even the best-performing model achieves only 48.3% scenario pass rate, revealing substantial room for improvement in bridging the gap between literal instruction-following and human-like contextual reasoning.

Intent Laundering: AI Safety Datasets Are Not What They Seem

We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used AI safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world attacks based on three key properties: driven by ulterior intent, well-crafted, and out-of-distribution. We find that these datasets overrely on "triggering cues": words or phrases with overt negative/sensitive connotations that are intended to trigger safety mechanisms explicitly, which is unrealistic compared to real-world attacks. In practice, we evaluate whether these datasets genuinely measure safety risks or merely provoke refusals through triggering cues. To explore this, we introduce "intent laundering": a procedure that abstracts away triggering cues from attacks (data points) while strictly preserving their malicious intent and all relevant details. Our results indicate that current AI safety datasets fail to faithfully represent real-world attacks due to their overreliance on triggering cues. In fact, once these cues are removed, all previously evaluated "reasonably safe" models become unsafe, including Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7. Moreover, when intent laundering is adapted as a jailbreaking technique, it consistently achieves high attack success rates, ranging from 90% to over 98%, under fully black-box access. Overall, our findings expose a significant disconnect between how model safety is evaluated and how real-world adversaries behave.

R-ConstraintBench: Evaluating LLMs on NP-Complete Scheduling

Effective scheduling under tight resource, timing, and operational constraints underpins large-scale planning across sectors such as capital projects, manufacturing, logistics, and IT fleet transitions. However, the reliability of large language models (LLMs) when reasoning under high-constraint regimes is insufficiently characterized. To address this gap, we present R-ConstraintBench, a scalable framework that evaluates models on Resource-Constrained Project Scheduling Problems (RCPSP), an NP-Complete feasibility class, while difficulty increases via linear growth in constraints. R-ConstraintBench incrementally increases non-redundant precedence constraints in Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) and then introduces downtime, temporal windows, and disjunctive constraints. As an illustrative example, we instantiate the benchmark in a data center migration setting and evaluate multiple LLMs using feasibility and error analysis, identifying degradation thresholds and constraint types most associated with failure. Empirically, strong models are near-ceiling on precedence-only DAGs, but feasibility performance collapses when downtime, temporal windows, and disjunctive constraints interact, implicating constraint interaction, not graph depth, as the principal bottleneck. Performance on clean synthetic ramps also does not guarantee transfer to domain-grounded scenarios, underscoring limited generalization.