Intent Laundering: AI Safety Datasets Are Not What They Seem

We systematically evaluate the quality of widely used AI safety datasets from two perspectives: in isolation and in practice. In isolation, we examine how well these datasets reflect real-world attacks based on three key properties: driven by ulterior intent, well-crafted, and out-of-distribution. We find that these datasets overrely on "triggering cues": words or phrases with overt negative/sensitive connotations that are intended to trigger safety mechanisms explicitly, which is unrealistic compared to real-world attacks. In practice, we evaluate whether these datasets genuinely measure safety risks or merely provoke refusals through triggering cues. To explore this, we introduce "intent laundering": a procedure that abstracts away triggering cues from attacks (data points) while strictly preserving their malicious intent and all relevant details. Our results indicate that current AI safety datasets fail to faithfully represent real-world attacks due to their overreliance on triggering cues. In fact, once these cues are removed, all previously evaluated "reasonably safe" models become unsafe, including Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7. Moreover, when intent laundering is adapted as a jailbreaking technique, it consistently achieves high attack success rates, ranging from 90% to over 98%, under fully black-box access. Overall, our findings expose a significant disconnect between how model safety is evaluated and how real-world adversaries behave.