Abstract:Heterogeneous graph neural networks (HGNNs) have achieved strong performance in modeling complex graph-structured data with multiple node and relation types. However, their robustness under realistic black-box adversarial settings remains insufficiently explored. Existing attacks on HGNNs usually assume access to model gradients, soft prediction scores, or the complete graph structure, which is often unavailable when HGNN-based services are deployed as closed systems. In this paper, we propose Blackknife, a hard-label, query-limited, and structure-limited black-box evasion attack framework for heterogeneous graph neural networks. Blackknife assumes no access to the victim model architecture, parameters, gradients, logits, confidence scores, or the full graph structure. Instead, it only relies on locally observable one-hop heterogeneous structures and a small number of hard-label queries. To generate effective perturbations under these strict constraints, Blackknife first constructs a local relation-aware surrogate model from observable heterogeneous neighborhoods. It then relaxes discrete edge addition and deletion operations into continuous soft weights and optimizes them through projected gradient descent. Finally, the optimized perturbations are discretized into relation-preserving structural rewiring operations and verified using limited hard-label feedback from the victim model. Extensive experiments on three benchmark heterogeneous graph datasets, including ACM, DBLP, and IMDB, demonstrate that Blackknife consistently achieves strong attack success rates against representative HGNN models. The results further show that Blackknife remains effective under topology-based defense strategies, revealing the vulnerability of HGNNs to local structure-limited black-box attacks.
Abstract:Heterogeneous graph neural networks (HGNNs) have achieved strong performance in many real-world applications, yet targeted backdoor poisoning on heterogeneous graphs remains less studied. We consider backdoor attacks for heterogeneous node classification, where an adversary injects a small set of trigger nodes and connections during training to force specific victim nodes to be misclassified into an attacker-chosen label at test time while preserving clean performance. We propose HeteroHBA, a generative backdoor framework that selects influential auxiliary neighbors for trigger attachment via saliency-based screening and synthesizes diverse trigger features and connection patterns to better match the local heterogeneous context. To improve stealthiness, we combine Adaptive Instance Normalization (AdaIN) with a Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) loss to align the trigger feature distribution with benign statistics, thereby reducing detectability, and we optimize the attack with a bilevel objective that jointly promotes attack success and maintains clean accuracy. Experiments on multiple real-world heterogeneous graphs with representative HGNN architectures show that HeteroHBA consistently achieves higher attack success than prior backdoor baselines with comparable or smaller impact on clean accuracy; moreover, the attack remains effective under our heterogeneity-aware structural defense, CSD. These results highlight practical backdoor risks in heterogeneous graph learning and motivate the development of stronger defenses.
Abstract:Heterogeneous graph neural networks (HGNNs) have recently drawn increasing attention for modeling complex multi-relational data in domains such as recommendation, finance, and social networks. While existing research has been largely focused on enhancing HGNNs' predictive performance, their robustness and security, especially under backdoor attacks, remain underexplored. In this paper, we propose a novel Heterogeneous Backdoor Attack (HeteroBA) framework for node classification tasks on heterogeneous graphs. HeteroBA inserts carefully crafted trigger nodes with realistic features and targeted structural connections, leveraging attention-based and clustering-based strategies to select influential auxiliary nodes for effective trigger propagation, thereby causing the model to misclassify specific nodes into a target label while maintaining accuracy on clean data. Experimental results on three datasets and various HGNN architectures demonstrate that HeteroBA achieves high attack success rates with minimal impact on the clean accuracy. Our method sheds light on potential vulnerabilities in HGNNs and calls for more robust defenses against backdoor threats in multi-relational graph scenarios.