On the Limits of Prompt-Conditioned Language Models as General-Purpose Learners

Large Language Models (LLMs) are frequently portrayed as general-purpose solvers capable of solving arbitrary tasks. We argue that this view overlooks a fundamental constraint: language is a compressed and capacity-limited interface for conveying task information. Modelling User--System interaction as a bilevel \emph{cheap-talk} game, we analyse how latent tasks are encoded into prompts and reinterpreted under alignment and safety constraints. We introduce a conceptual decomposition separating task inference from execution and derive PAC-Bayes bounds that distinguish finite-sample estimation error from irreducible structural limitations. Our first main result establishes an \emph{expressivity floor}: language acts as a capacity-limited communication channel, and whenever the informational complexity of a task family exceeds the capacity of that channel, distinct tasks become unavoidably indistinguishable to the Solver, inducing a strictly positive error floor that cannot be eliminated by additional data, optimisation, or model scaling alone. We then establish an \emph{objective-misalignment floor}: when alignment constraints restrict the admissible output set, the User-ideal distribution may lie outside the feasible class, inducing an irreducible distortion. Together, these results yield a formal negative conclusion: prompt-conditioned LLMs are not universal problem solvers through prompting alone, as there exist task families for which correct behaviour is provably unattainable even in the infinite-data regime. More broadly, our analysis shows the limits of prompt-based generalisation arise from information-constrained communication and alignment-constrained objectives. This suggests that interfaces beyond natural language, including multimodal observations and, external memory, may reduce the inherent LLM limitations by increasing the task-relevant information available to the System.

On the Geometry of Games and their Solvers

A central challenge in game theory and learning systems such as GANs is understanding which algorithms can efficiently compute equilibria across the heterogeneous landscape of games. Equilibrium computation is typically studied solver by solver and game class by game class, yielding strong local guarantees but a fragmented view of solver behaviour. Existing discrete taxonomies often provide an incomplete account of where algorithms succeed. We study this problem through a solver-game map linking games to effective solver dynamics. Classical theory identifies isolated regions of this map but provides limited insight into intermediate or overlapping regimes, suggesting that solvability is governed by latent structural properties defining a continuous solver-aligned geometry of games. We formalise this perspective through structure-aware solver synthesis. A learned structure recogniser maps each game to a low-dimensional solver-aligned representation, and a policy maps this representation to effective primitive mechanisms, adapting solver behaviour across regimes. This reveals regions where particular solver dynamics are effective and where mixtures of primitives are required rather than a single dominant solver. A bounded residual acts as a local corrector and diagnostic signal for incomplete solver bases or representations. The framework yields both an adaptive solver and an analytical lens: games with similar optimisation dynamics cluster together, revealing continuous regions of algorithmic validity and overlapping solver behaviour. Empirically, we show that fixed primitives exhibit systematic regime mismatch, while the learned representation organises game space into a structured cartography aligned with solver behaviour. These results suggest viewing equilibrium computation as the joint problem of learning solver mechanisms and mapping the geometry of solvability.