ReWEIGH the Evidence: Calibrating Token-Level Ordinal Visual Evidence to Mitigate Hallucinations in Large Vision-Language Models

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) often hallucinate, generating content that the input image does not support. Preventing such content during decoding calls for a candidate-specific measure of how strongly the image supports the token under consideration. The model's visual-token states offer a natural source of this evidence because projecting each state through the output head reveals which vocabulary items that position favors. These position-wise readouts cannot be pooled directly because their probability magnitudes are not comparable across visual positions. Vocabulary ranks provide a scale-invariant basis for pooling, but tokens still differ systematically in their typical rank-based evidence. We propose ReWEIGH, a training-free decoding intervention that aggregates these ranks across visual positions and compares each candidate with a token-specific reference estimated from unlabeled images. At inference, ReWEIGH caches the image evidence during prefill and applies a bounded penalty only to candidates that fall below their reference. On four 7B backbones, ReWEIGH reduces hallucinated object mentions by up to 21.3% while largely preserving or improving descriptive and general performance. With evidence cached, the average added latency is 1.33% per token, and the reductions extend across six architecture families to 32B parameters.

Are Vision-Language Models Safe in the Wild? A Meme-Based Benchmark Study

Rapid deployment of vision-language models (VLMs) magnifies safety risks, yet most evaluations rely on artificial images. This study asks: How safe are current VLMs when confronted with meme images that ordinary users share? To investigate this question, we introduce MemeSafetyBench, a 50,430-instance benchmark pairing real meme images with both harmful and benign instructions. Using a comprehensive safety taxonomy and LLM-based instruction generation, we assess multiple VLMs across single and multi-turn interactions. We investigate how real-world memes influence harmful outputs, the mitigating effects of conversational context, and the relationship between model scale and safety metrics. Our findings demonstrate that VLMs show greater vulnerability to meme-based harmful prompts than to synthetic or typographic images. Memes significantly increase harmful responses and decrease refusals compared to text-only inputs. Though multi-turn interactions provide partial mitigation, elevated vulnerability persists. These results highlight the need for ecologically valid evaluations and stronger safety mechanisms.