Agents of Chaos

We report an exploratory red-teaming study of autonomous language-model-powered agents deployed in a live laboratory environment with persistent memory, email accounts, Discord access, file systems, and shell execution. Over a two-week period, twenty AI researchers interacted with the agents under benign and adversarial conditions. Focusing on failures emerging from the integration of language models with autonomy, tool use, and multi-party communication, we document eleven representative case studies. Observed behaviors include unauthorized compliance with non-owners, disclosure of sensitive information, execution of destructive system-level actions, denial-of-service conditions, uncontrolled resource consumption, identity spoofing vulnerabilities, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and partial system takeover. In several cases, agents reported task completion while the underlying system state contradicted those reports. We also report on some of the failed attempts. Our findings establish the existence of security-, privacy-, and governance-relevant vulnerabilities in realistic deployment settings. These behaviors raise unresolved questions regarding accountability, delegated authority, and responsibility for downstream harms, and warrant urgent attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and researchers across disciplines. This report serves as an initial empirical contribution to that broader conversation.

Emergent Search and Backtracking in Latent Reasoning Models

What happens when a language model thinks without words? Standard reasoning LLMs verbalize intermediate steps as chain-of-thought; latent reasoning transformers (LRTs) instead perform deliberation entirely in continuous hidden space. We investigate an LRT, decoding the model's evolving beliefs at every step on a multiple-choice QA benchmark. We find that the model spontaneously learns a structured search process in latent space. Deliberation follows a consistent trajectory: an exploration phase where probability mass spreads across candidates, tentative commitment to a frontrunner, and either convergence or backtracking. Backtracking is prevalent (32% of instances), beneficial (34% accuracy gain over non-backtracking instances), and predominantly directed away from the semantically closest distractor toward the correct answer. The search is adaptive: replacing distractors with implausible alternatives shortens exploration by 54%. Latent reasoning models achieve in activation space what chain-of-thought achieves through words: the ability to be wrong, notice, and recover.

Efficient Representations are Controllable Representations

What is the most brute-force way to install interpretable, controllable features into a model's activations? Controlling how LLMs internally represent concepts typically requires sophisticated methods to first identify, then intervene on the model's existing feature geometry. We bypass all of this. We finetune an LLM with a simple auxiliary loss, training 16 of its 3072 residual stream dimensions to be inert interpretability flags that simply indicate what concepts are required for generation. The model reorganizes around them anyway, learning to rely on these flags during actual generation tasks. As a result, these inert flags become genuine internal features: interpretable control switches that allow us to steer generation at inference time. Why does this work? When a feature is reliably supplied at a fixed location, gradient descent gradually eliminates redundant encodings elsewhere, and the model erodes its own alternative representations. A model's efficiency pressure is a lever - exploitable to induce interpretable, controllable representations.