Quantifying the Agreement Between Data-Influence and Data-Similarity to Understand LLM Behavior

One way to understand LLM behavior is to trace its output back to the training data. Two types of measures are commonly used for output tracing: data-similarity and data-influence. The former is cheaper while the latter is believed to be more accurate. Even though many works have compared them for ground-truth tasks, no such comparisons exist for output tracing. Here, we fill this gap and precisely quantify the commonalities and differences between the two measures. We do this by first ranking the training documents according to each measure and then computing the overlap between the two rankings. Our main finding is that the two rankings agree significantly, but there is an asymmetry between them: The top documents of data-similarity are assigned more consistent ranks by data-influence than the other way around. This result is valid across a range of experiments involving OLMo2-1B, Qwen3-1.7B, LlaMa3.2-1B, Gemma3-1B, and GPT2. We exploit the asymmetry to obtain a favorable cost-accuracy trade-off by using the costly data-influence to refine the results of data-similarity.

LLM Detectors Still Fall Short of Real World: Case of LLM-Generated Short News-Like Posts

With the emergence of widely available powerful LLMs, disinformation generated by large Language Models (LLMs) has become a major concern. Historically, LLM detectors have been touted as a solution, but their effectiveness in the real world is still to be proven. In this paper, we focus on an important setting in information operations -- short news-like posts generated by moderately sophisticated attackers. We demonstrate that existing LLM detectors, whether zero-shot or purpose-trained, are not ready for real-world use in that setting. All tested zero-shot detectors perform inconsistently with prior benchmarks and are highly vulnerable to sampling temperature increase, a trivial attack absent from recent benchmarks. A purpose-trained detector generalizing across LLMs and unseen attacks can be developed, but it fails to generalize to new human-written texts. We argue that the former indicates domain-specific benchmarking is needed, while the latter suggests a trade-off between the adversarial evasion resilience and overfitting to the reference human text, with both needing evaluation in benchmarks and currently absent. We believe this suggests a re-consideration of current LLM detector benchmarking approaches and provides a dynamically extensible benchmark to allow it (https://github.com/Reliable-Information-Lab-HEVS/dynamic_llm_detector_benchmark).