LP-Eval: Rubric and Dataset for Measuring the Quality of Legal Proposition Generation

Legal proposition generation is central to legal reasoning and doctrinal scholarship, yet remain under-examined in Legal NLP. This paper investigates the automatic generation and evaluation of legal propositions from decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union using large language models (LLMs). We introduce LP-Eval, a three-step evaluation rubric co-designed with legal experts that decomposes legal proposition quality into formal validity and substantive dimensions. Using this rubric, we release a dataset of two experts' annotations for 100 LLM-generated legal propositions. Our results show that LLMs can generate predominantly well-formed and high-quality propositions, while expert evaluations reveal higher quality for propositions derived from well established cases than from recent ones. We further examine LLMs as evaluators and find that rubric-guided LLM judgments align more closely with expert assessments than direct overall scoring, but remain insensitive to finer-grained distinctions captured by human experts.

The Neutrality Fallacy: When Algorithmic Fairness Interventions are (Not) Positive Action

Various metrics and interventions have been developed to identify and mitigate unfair outputs of machine learning systems. While individuals and organizations have an obligation to avoid discrimination, the use of fairness-aware machine learning interventions has also been described as amounting to 'algorithmic positive action' under European Union (EU) non-discrimination law. As the Court of Justice of the European Union has been strict when it comes to assessing the lawfulness of positive action, this would impose a significant legal burden on those wishing to implement fair-ml interventions. In this paper, we propose that algorithmic fairness interventions often should be interpreted as a means to prevent discrimination, rather than a measure of positive action. Specifically, we suggest that this category mistake can often be attributed to neutrality fallacies: faulty assumptions regarding the neutrality of fairness-aware algorithmic decision-making. Our findings raise the question of whether a negative obligation to refrain from discrimination is sufficient in the context of algorithmic decision-making. Consequently, we suggest moving away from a duty to 'not do harm' towards a positive obligation to actively 'do no harm' as a more adequate framework for algorithmic decision-making and fair ml-interventions.