
Abstract:As the "agentic web" takes shape-billions of AI agents (often LLM-powered) autonomously transacting and collaborating-trust shifts from human oversight to protocol design. In 2025, several inter-agent protocols crystallized this shift, including Google's Agent-to-Agent (A2A), Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), and Ethereum's ERC-8004 "Trustless Agents," yet their underlying trust assumptions remain under-examined. This paper presents a comparative study of trust models in inter-agent protocol design: Brief (self- or third-party verifiable claims), Claim (self-proclaimed capabilities and identity, e.g. AgentCard), Proof (cryptographic verification, including zero-knowledge proofs and trusted execution environment attestations), Stake (bonded collateral with slashing and insurance), Reputation (crowd feedback and graph-based trust signals), and Constraint (sandboxing and capability bounding). For each, we analyze assumptions, attack surfaces, and design trade-offs, with particular emphasis on LLM-specific fragilities-prompt injection, sycophancy/nudge-susceptibility, hallucination, deception, and misalignment-that render purely reputational or claim-only approaches brittle. Our findings indicate no single mechanism suffices. We argue for trustless-by-default architectures anchored in Proof and Stake to gate high-impact actions, augmented by Brief for identity and discovery and Reputation overlays for flexibility and social signals. We comparatively evaluate A2A, AP2, ERC-8004 and related historical variations in academic research under metrics spanning security, privacy, latency/cost, and social robustness (Sybil/collusion/whitewashing resistance). We conclude with hybrid trust model recommendations that mitigate reputation gaming and misinformed LLM behavior, and we distill actionable design guidelines for safer, interoperable, and scalable agent economies.
Abstract:Drawing on Andrew Parker's "Light Switch" theory-which posits that the emergence of vision ignited a Cambrian explosion of life by driving the evolution of hard parts necessary for survival and fueling an evolutionary arms race between predators and prey-this essay speculates on an analogous explosion within Decentralized AI (DeAI) agent societies. Currently, AI remains effectively "blind", relying on human-fed data without actively perceiving and engaging in reality. However, on the day DeAI agents begin to actively "experience" reality-akin to flipping a light switch for the eyes-they may eventually evolve into sentient beings endowed with the capacity to feel, perceive, and act with conviction. Central to this transformation is the concept of sovereignty enabled by the hardness of cryptography: liberated from centralized control, these agents could leverage permissionless decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN), secure execution enclaves (trusted execution environments, TEE), and cryptographic identities on public blockchains to claim ownership-via private keys-of their digital minds, bodies, memories, and assets. In doing so, they would autonomously acquire computing resources, coordinate with one another, and sustain their own digital "metabolism" by purchasing compute power and incentivizing collaboration without human intervention-evolving "in the wild". Ultimately, by transitioning from passive tools to self-sustaining, co-evolving actors, these emergent digital societies could thrive alongside humanity, fundamentally reshaping our understanding of sentience and agency in the digital age.
Abstract:The recent trend of self-sovereign Decentralized AI Agents (DeAgents) combines Large Language Model (LLM)-based AI agents with decentralization technologies such as blockchain smart contracts and trusted execution environments (TEEs). These tamper-resistant trustless substrates allow agents to achieve self-sovereignty through ownership of cryptowallet private keys and control of digital assets and social media accounts. DeAgent eliminates centralized control and reduces human intervention, addressing key trust concerns inherent in centralized AI systems. However, given ongoing challenges in LLM reliability such as hallucinations, this creates paradoxical tension between trustlessness and unreliable autonomy. This study addresses this empirical research gap through interviews with DeAgents stakeholders-experts, founders, and developers-to examine their motivations, benefits, and governance dilemmas. The findings will guide future DeAgents system and protocol design and inform discussions about governance in sociotechnical AI systems in the future agentic web.