Crushing the Evidence: A Dual-Penalty Evasion Framework for Fooling White-Box Explainable AI Auditors

Post-hoc model explainers such as LIME, SHAP, and Integrated Gradients are widely deployed to audit models in high-stakes sensitive domains, including finance, healthcare, and social welfare. This ensures the model's transparency and acceptability. However, a few studies have examined potential attacks in the explainability pipeline. Adversaries can attempt to conceal algorithmic biases or backdoors using adversarial explanation attacks. These attacks have relied on scaffolding out-of-distribution (OOD) detectors that toggle predictions when queried by an explainer. Consequently, defenses have been developed to successfully neutralize these black-box attacks by identifying their anomalous perturbation footprints. In this paper, we demonstrate a critical vulnerability by introducing a more potent white-box, gradient-regularized evasion attack framework. By employing a continuous-embedding dual-penalty framework, we directly penalize trigger feature gradients during training on in-distribution data. Since our approach embeds the evasion logic natively into the model parameters, without relying on OOD scaffolding wrappers, it generates smooth, in-distribution predictions that leave no anomaly footprint. Empirical evaluations across four benchmark tabular datasets (COMPAS, German Credit, IEEE-CIS, and Communities & Crime) confirm that our method systematically crushes target feature attribution to near-zero (<0.02), maintains >90% Attack Success Rates, and fundamentally bypasses Conditional Anomaly Detection.

PRoVeFL: Private Robust and Verifiable Aggregation in Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) enables multiple clients to collaboratively train machine learning models while retaining data locality, thereby enhancing user privacy. However, traditional FL frameworks rely on a centralized aggregation server and assume honest-but-curious clients, making them susceptible to both server-side inference and client-side poisoning attacks. Although recent work has explored secure and Byzantine-resilient FL protocols, they face a fundamental trade-off among privacy, integrity, and verifiability, and incur substantial computational and communication overhead due to the heavy use of cryptographic primitives. In this work, we propose PRoVeFL-a novel, modular FL framework that is Privacy-preserving, Byzantine-Robust, and ensures Verifiable aggregation. PRoVeFL employs multiple servers leveraging multi-key fully homomorphic encryption. Each client encrypts its local model updates and distributes encrypted shares to all servers. This design enables a hybrid computation model in which ciphertext operations are carefully offloaded to the plaintext domain under strict privacy constraints to efficiently evaluate complex statistical aggregation rules. PRoVeFL is compatible with a wide range of state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust aggregation algorithms (e.g., Krum, Trimmed Mean, FLTrust, norm clipping, MESAS, and more) and further enhances them with verifiability mechanisms that require minimal trust in at least one honest server. We evaluate it across different settings and demonstrate its scalability with varying numbers of parameters and participants. PRoVeFL improves runtime over the prior works, Prio and ELSA, based on distributed trust with comparable security guarantees, up to 100x and 10x, respectively.

CQSA: Byzantine-robust Clustered Quantum Secure Aggregation in Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative model training without sharing raw data. However, shared local model updates remain vulnerable to inference and poisoning attacks. Secure aggregation schemes have been proposed to mitigate these attacks. In this work, we aim to understand how these techniques are implemented in quantum-assisted FL. Quantum Secure Aggregation (QSA) has been proposed, offering information-theoretic privacy by encoding client updates into the global phase of multipartite entangled states. Existing QSA protocols, however, rely on a single global Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state shared among all participating clients. This design poses fundamental challenges: fidelity of large-scale GHZ states deteriorates rapidly with the increasing number of clients; and (ii) the global aggregation prevents the detection of Byzantine clients. We propose Clustered Quantum Secure Aggregation (CQSA), a modular aggregation framework that reconciles the physical constraints of near-term quantum hardware along with the need for Byzantine-robustness in FL. CQSA randomly partitions the clients into small clusters, each performing local quantum aggregation using high-fidelity, low-qubit GHZ states. The server analyzes statistical relationships between cluster-level aggregates employing common statistical measures such as cosine similarity and Euclidean distance to identify malicious contributions. Through theoretical analysis and simulations under depolarizing noise, we demonstrate that CQSA ensures stable model convergence, achieves superior state fidelity over global QSA.

Analysis of LLMs Against Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Attacks

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely deployed in real-world systems. Given their broader applicability, prompt engineering has become an efficient tool for resource-scarce organizations to adopt LLMs for their own purposes. At the same time, LLMs are vulnerable to prompt-based attacks. Thus, analyzing this risk has become a critical security requirement. This work evaluates prompt-injection and jailbreak vulnerability using a large, manually curated dataset across multiple open-source LLMs, including Phi, Mistral, DeepSeek-R1, Llama 3.2, Qwen, and Gemma variants. We observe significant behavioural variation across models, including refusal responses and complete silent non-responsiveness triggered by internal safety mechanisms. Furthermore, we evaluated several lightweight, inference-time defence mechanisms that operate as filters without any retraining or GPU-intensive fine-tuning. Although these defences mitigate straightforward attacks, they are consistently bypassed by long, reasoning-heavy prompts.