Abstract:Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) ensure protection against malicious attacks on networked systems. While deep learning-based IDSs achieve effective performance, their limited trustworthiness due to black-box architectures remains a critical constraint. Despite existing explainable techniques offering insight into the alarms raised by IDSs, they lack process-based explanations grounded in packet-level sequencing analysis. In this paper, we propose a method that employs process mining techniques to enhance anomaly-based IDSs by providing process-based alarm severity ratings and explanations for alerts. Our method prioritizes critical alerts and maintains visibility into network behavior, while minimizing disruption by allowing misclassified benign traffic to pass. We apply the method to the publicly available USB-IDS-TC dataset, which includes anomalous traffic affected by different variants of the Slowloris DoS attack. Results show that our method is able to discriminate between low- to very-high-severity alarms while preserving up to 99.94% recall and 99.99% precision, effectively discarding false positives while providing different degrees of severity for the true positives.
Abstract:While attack graphs are useful for identifying major cybersecurity threats affecting a system, they do not provide operational support for determining the likelihood of having a known vulnerability exploited, or that critical system nodes are likely to be compromised. In this paper, we perform dynamic risk assessment by combining Bayesian Attack Graphs (BAGs) and online monitoring of system behavior through process mining. Specifically, the proposed approach applies process mining techniques to characterize malicious network traffic and derive evidence regarding the probability of having a vulnerability actively exploited. This evidence is then provided to a BAG, which updates its conditional probability tables accordingly, enabling dynamic assessment of vulnerability exploitation. We apply our method to a cybersecurity testbed instantiating several machines deployed on different subnets and affected by several CVE vulnerabilities. The testbed is stimulated with both benign traffic and malicious behavior, which simulates network attack patterns aimed at exploiting the CVE vulnerabilities. The results indicate that our proposal effectively detects whether vulnerabilities are being actively exploited, allowing for an updated assessment of the probability of system compromise.
Abstract:Context: Ensuring high levels of dependability in modern computer-based systems has become increasingly challenging due to their complexity. Although systems are validated at design time, their behavior can be different at run-time, possibly showing control-flow anomalies due to "unknown unknowns". Objective: We aim to detect control-flow anomalies through software monitoring, which verifies run-time behavior by logging software execution and detecting deviations from expected control flow. Methods: We propose a methodology to develop software monitors for control-flow anomaly detection through Large Language Models (LLMs) and conformance checking. The methodology builds on existing software development practices to maintain traditional V&V while providing an additional level of robustness and trustworthiness. It leverages LLMs to link design-time models and implementation code, automating source-code instrumentation. The resulting event logs are analyzed via conformance checking, an explainable and effective technique for control-flow anomaly detection. Results: We test the methodology on a case-study scenario from the European Railway Traffic Management System / European Train Control System (ERTMS/ETCS), which is a railway standard for modern interoperable railways. The results obtained from the ERTMS/ETCS case study demonstrate that LLM-based source-code instrumentation can achieve up to 84.775% control-flow coverage of the reference design-time process model, while the subsequent conformance checking-based anomaly detection reaches a peak performance of 96.610% F1-score and 93.515% AUC. Conclusion: Incorporating domain-specific knowledge to guide LLMs in source-code instrumentation significantly allowed obtaining reliable and quality software logs and enabled effective control-flow anomaly detection through conformance checking.
Abstract:Fault diagnosis in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is essential for ensuring system dependability and operational efficiency by accurately detecting anomalies and identifying their root causes. However, the manual modeling of faulty behaviors often demands extensive domain expertise and produces models that are complex, error-prone, and difficult to interpret. To address this challenge, we present a novel unsupervised fault diagnosis methodology that integrates collective anomaly detection in multivariate time series, process mining, and stochastic simulation. Initially, collective anomalies are detected from low-level sensor data using multivariate time-series analysis. These anomalies are then transformed into structured event logs, enabling the discovery of interpretable process models through process mining. By incorporating timing distributions into the extracted Petri nets, the approach supports stochastic simulation of faulty behaviors, thereby enhancing root cause analysis and behavioral understanding. The methodology is validated using the Robotic Arm Dataset (RoAD), a widely recognized benchmark in smart manufacturing. Experimental results demonstrate its effectiveness in modeling, simulating, and classifying faulty behaviors in CPSs. This enables the creation of comprehensive fault dictionaries that support predictive maintenance and the development of digital twins for industrial environments.