Large machine learning models, or so-called foundation models, aim to serve as base-models for application-oriented machine learning. Although these models showcase impressive performance, they have been empirically found to pose serious security and privacy issues. We may however wonder if this is a limitation of the current models, or if these issues stem from a fundamental intrinsic impossibility of the foundation model learning problem itself. This paper aims to systematize our knowledge supporting the latter. More precisely, we identify several key features of today's foundation model learning problem which, given the current understanding in adversarial machine learning, suggest incompatibility of high accuracy with both security and privacy. We begin by observing that high accuracy seems to require (1) very high-dimensional models and (2) huge amounts of data that can only be procured through user-generated datasets. Moreover, such data is fundamentally heterogeneous, as users generally have very specific (easily identifiable) data-generating habits. More importantly, users' data is filled with highly sensitive information, and maybe heavily polluted by fake users. We then survey lower bounds on accuracy in privacy-preserving and Byzantine-resilient heterogeneous learning that, we argue, constitute a compelling case against the possibility of designing a secure and privacy-preserving high-accuracy foundation model. We further stress that our analysis also applies to other high-stake machine learning applications, including content recommendation. We conclude by calling for measures to prioritize security and privacy, and to slow down the race for ever larger models.
Byzantine Machine Learning (ML) systems are nowadays vulnerable for they require trusted machines and/or a synchronous network. We present Garfield, a system that provably achieves Byzantine resilience in ML applications without assuming any trusted component nor any bound on communication or computation delays. Garfield leverages ML specificities to make progress despite consensus being impossible in such an asynchronous, Byzantine environment. Following the classical server/worker architecture, Garfield replicates the parameter server while relying on the statistical properties of stochastic gradient descent to keep the models on the correct servers close to each other. On the other hand, Garfield uses statistically-robust gradient aggregation rules (GARs) to achieve resilience against Byzantine workers. We integrate Garfield with two widely-used ML frameworks, TensorFlow and PyTorch, while achieving transparency: applications developed with either framework do not need to change their interfaces to be made Byzantine resilient. Our implementation supports full-stack computations on both CPUs and GPUs. We report on our evaluation of Garfield with different (a) baselines, (b) ML models (e.g., ResNet-50 and VGG), and (c) hardware infrastructures (CPUs and GPUs). Our evaluation highlights several interesting facts about the cost of Byzantine resilience. In particular, (a) Byzantine resilience, unlike crash resilience, induces an accuracy loss, and (b) the throughput overhead comes much more from communication (70%) than from aggregation.
We address the problem of Byzantine collaborative learning: a set of $n$ nodes try to collectively learn from data, whose distributions may vary from one node to another. None of them is trusted and $f < n$ can behave arbitrarily. We show that collaborative learning is equivalent to a new form of agreement, which we call averaging agreement. In this problem, nodes start each with an initial vector and seek to approximately agree on a common vector, while guaranteeing that this common vector remains within a constant (also called averaging constant) of the maximum distance between the original vectors. Essentially, the smaller the averaging constant, the better the learning. We present three asynchronous solutions to averaging agreement, each interesting in its own right. The first, based on the minimum volume ellipsoid, achieves asymptotically the best-possible averaging constant but requires $ n \geq 6f+1$. The second, based on reliable broadcast, achieves optimal Byzantine resilience, i.e., $n \geq 3f+1$, but requires signatures and induces a large number of communication rounds. The third, based on coordinate-wise trimmed mean, is faster and achieves optimal Byzantine resilience, i.e., $n \geq 4f+1$, within standard form algorithms that do not use signatures.
Momentum is a variant of gradient descent that has been proposed for its benefits on convergence. In a distributed setting, momentum can be implemented either at the server or the worker side. When the aggregation rule used by the server is linear, commutativity with addition makes both deployments equivalent. Robustness and privacy are however among motivations to abandon linear aggregation rules. In this work, we demonstrate the benefits on robustness of using momentum at the worker side. We first prove that computing momentum at the workers reduces the variance-norm ratio of the gradient estimation at the server, strengthening Byzantine resilient aggregation rules. We then provide an extensive experimental demonstration of the robustness effect of worker-side momentum on distributed SGD.
Modern machine learning is distributed and the work of several machines is typically aggregated by \emph{averaging} which is the optimal rule in terms of speed, offering a speedup of $n$ (with respect to using a single machine) when $n$ processes are learning together. Distributing data and models poses however fundamental vulnerabilities, be they to software bugs, asynchrony, or worse, to malicious attackers controlling some machines or injecting misleading data in the network. Such behavior is best modeled as Byzantine failures, and averaging does not tolerate a single one from a worker. Krum, the first provably Byzantine resilient aggregation rule for SGD only uses one worker per step, which hampers its speed of convergence, especially in best case conditions when none of the workers is actually Byzantine. An idea, coined multi-Krum, of using $m$ different workers per step was mentioned, without however any proof neither on its Byzantine resilience nor on its slowdown. More recently, it was shown that in high dimensional machine learning, guaranteeing convergence is not a sufficient condition for \emph{strong} Byzantine resilience. A improvement on Krum, coined Bulyan, was proposed and proved to guarantee stronger resilience. However, Bulyan suffers from the same weakness of Krum: using only one worker per step. This adds up to the aforementioned open problem and leaves the crucial need for both fast and strong Byzantine resilience unfulfilled. The present paper proposes using Bulyan over Multi-Krum (we call it Multi-Bulyan), a combination for which we provide proofs of strong Byzantine resilience, as well as an ${\frac{m}{n}}$ slowdown, compared to averaging, the fastest (but non Byzantine resilient) rule for distributed machine learning, finally we prove that Multi-Bulyan inherits the $O(d)$ merits of both multi-Krum and Bulyan.
The size of the datasets available today leads to distribute Machine Learning (ML) tasks. An SGD--based optimization is for instance typically carried out by two categories of participants: parameter servers and workers. Some of these nodes can sometimes behave arbitrarily (called \emph{Byzantine} and caused by corrupt/bogus data/machines), impacting the accuracy of the entire learning activity. Several approaches recently studied how to tolerate Byzantine workers, while assuming honest and trusted parameter servers. In order to achieve total ML robustness, we introduce GuanYu, the first algorithm (to the best of our knowledge) to handle Byzantine parameter servers as well as Byzantine workers. We prove that GuanYu ensures convergence against $\frac{1}{3}$ Byzantine parameter servers and $\frac{1}{3}$ Byzantine workers, which is optimal in asynchronous networks (GuanYu does also tolerate unbounded communication delays, i.e.\ asynchrony). To prove the Byzantine resilience of GuanYu, we use a contraction argument, leveraging geometric properties of the median in high dimensional spaces to prevent (with probability 1) any drift on the models within each of the non-Byzantine servers. % To convey its practicality, we implemented GuanYu using the low-level TensorFlow APIs and deployed it in a distributed setup using the CIFAR-10 dataset. The overhead of tolerating Byzantine participants, compared to a vanilla TensorFlow deployment that is vulnerable to a single Byzantine participant, is around 30\% in terms of throughput (model updates per second) - while maintaining the same convergence rate (model updates required to reach some accuracy).