ClawWorm: Self-Propagating Attacks Across LLM Agent Ecosystems

Autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly operate as long-running processes forming densely interconnected multi-agent ecosystems, whose security properties remain largely unexplored. In particular, OpenClaw, an open-source platform with over 40{,}000 active instances, has stood out recently with its persistent configurations, tool-execution privileges, and cross-platform messaging capabilities. In this work, we present ClawWorm, the first self-replicating worm attack against a production-scale agent framework, achieving a fully autonomous infection cycle initiated by a single message: the worm first hijacks the victim's core configuration to establish persistent presence across session restarts, then executes an arbitrary payload upon each reboot, and finally propagates itself to every newly encountered peer without further attacker intervention. We evaluate the attack on a controlled testbed across three distinct infection vectors and three payload types, demonstrating high success rates in end-to-end infection, sustained multi-hop propagation, and payload independence from the worm mechanism. We analyse the architectural root causes underlying these vulnerabilities and propose defence strategies targeting each identified trust boundary. Code and samples will be released upon completion of responsible disclosure.

RACA: Representation-Aware Coverage Criteria for LLM Safety Testing

Recent advancements in LLMs have led to significant breakthroughs in various AI applications. However, their sophisticated capabilities also introduce severe safety concerns, particularly the generation of harmful content through jailbreak attacks. Current safety testing for LLMs often relies on static datasets and lacks systematic criteria to evaluate the quality and adequacy of these tests. While coverage criteria have been effective for smaller neural networks, they are not directly applicable to LLMs due to scalability issues and differing objectives. To address these challenges, this paper introduces RACA, a novel set of coverage criteria specifically designed for LLM safety testing. RACA leverages representation engineering to focus on safety-critical concepts within LLMs, thereby reducing dimensionality and filtering out irrelevant information. The framework operates in three stages: first, it identifies safety-critical representations using a small, expert-curated calibration set of jailbreak prompts. Second, it calculates conceptual activation scores for a given test suite based on these representations. Finally, it computes coverage results using six sub-criteria that assess both individual and compositional safety concepts. We conduct comprehensive experiments to validate RACA's effectiveness, applicability, and generalization, where the results demonstrate that RACA successfully identifies high-quality jailbreak prompts and is superior to traditional neuron-level criteria. We also showcase its practical application in real-world scenarios, such as test set prioritization and attack prompt sampling. Furthermore, our findings confirm RACA's generalization to various scenarios and its robustness across various configurations. Overall, RACA provides a new framework for evaluating the safety of LLMs, contributing a valuable technique to the field of testing for AI.

Mitigating Fine-tuning Risks in LLMs via Safety-Aware Probing Optimization

The significant progress of large language models (LLMs) has led to remarkable achievements across numerous applications. However, their ability to generate harmful content has sparked substantial safety concerns. Despite the implementation of safety alignment techniques during the pre-training phase, recent research indicates that fine-tuning LLMs on adversarial or even benign data can inadvertently compromise their safety. In this paper, we re-examine the fundamental issue of why fine-tuning on non-harmful data still results in safety degradation. We introduce a safety-aware probing (SAP) optimization framework designed to mitigate the safety risks of fine-tuning LLMs. Specifically, SAP incorporates a safety-aware probe into the gradient propagation process, mitigating the model's risk of safety degradation by identifying potential pitfalls in gradient directions, thereby enhancing task-specific performance while successfully preserving model safety. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate that SAP effectively reduces harmfulness below the original fine-tuned model and achieves comparable test loss to standard fine-tuning methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/ChengcanWu/SAP.