Beyond Layer Importance in Layer-wise Sparsity: An Inter-Layer Perturbation-Absorption Perspective

The considerable layer-wise redundancy in large language models (LLMs) has established non-uniform sparsity allocation across layers as the standard pruning approach for efficient compression. Existing layer-wise allocation methods that estimate allocation strategy from local signals such as activation outliers or weight spectra mainly derive from local layer importance, whereas the final post-pruning performance is also influenced by the network's subsequent compensatory capacity. In this paper, we directly characterize this property through controlled perturbation experiments. We make the following empirical findings. First, layers exhibit highly heterogeneous responses to pruning-scale perturbations. In most cases, early layers amplify perturbations, while middle and late layers actively absorb them, with relative L2 drift decreasing monotonically across depth and direction realigning toward the unperturbed hidden-state trajectory. Second, absorption is a large-perturbation phenomenon. Under small perturbations the network exhibits amplification across all layers, and the transition to absorption occurs smoothly as perturbation magnitude grows to pruning scale. This enriches the linearized accumulation theory underlying related works. Building on these findings, we define an absorption coefficient per layer and propose absorption-aware correction, an orthogonal augmentation that improves OWL and AlphaPruning by reducing perplexity by 7.13% and boosting zero-shot accuracy by 1.02% across multiple model families at 70% sparsity.

THRD: A Training-Free Multi-Turn Defense Framework for Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models

Multi-turn jailbreak attacks pose a growing threat to LLMs by exploiting conversational dynamics such as gradual escalation and cross-turn coordination. Existing defenses either rely on costly retraining -- often degrading model utility -- or apply single-turn analysis independently at each turn, failing to capture how risk accumulates along interaction trajectories. We observe that safety behavior in multi-turn interaction is trajectory-dependent: dialogue history continuously reshapes the model's conditioning context, making it insufficient to evaluate each turn in isolation. Motivated by this insight, we present THRD, the first training-free framework that explicitly models temporal risk accumulation for multi-turn jailbreak defense. THRD integrates four modules: a Turn-level Risk Assessor (TRA) for instantaneous risk estimation, a Historical Context Analyzer (HCA) for cross-turn intent escalation detection, a Response Evaluator (RE) for identifying facilitative outputs, and a Decision Module that combines these signals through a time-evolving scoring mechanism with attenuation-based modulation and trend-aware adjustment. Experiments against state-of-the-art multi-turn attacks -- including tree-search-based and multi-agent collaborative methods -- across two target models show that THRD reduces ASR to 0.2--4.0% while preserving model utility within 1.5% degradation on MMLU and GSM8K. Ablation studies confirm non-redundant module contributions and stable cross-architecture generalization. Analysis of first rejection triggers reveals that over 70% of multi-turn attacks require Turn~2 or later to detect, validating the necessity of explicit temporal aggregation.