Manipulation-Proof Oblivious Audits against Deceptive Model Providers

Audits have emerged as a critical instrument for algorithmic governance, providing a mechanism for external scrutiny and governance of machine learning models. However, ensuring the integrity of such assessments remains a challenging issue. For instance in regulatory contexts, audits are typically declared or easily detected, thus enabling model providers to manipulate the process, whether intentionally or inadvertently. This vulnerability is particularly acute in the context of fairness evaluations, in which providers can often infer sensitive attributes and strategically equalize allocation rates between groups to satisfy fairness metrics. In this paper, we introduce a novel audit protocol designed to significantly increase the post-audit detectability of such manipulations by enabling the auditor to query the model in an oblivious manner. Our approach leverages a Private Information Retrieval mechanism to require the provider to label a large set of instances, while preventing it from knowing which subset will ultimately be used for the audit. The protocol is efficient, imposes minimal overhead on the auditor, and requires no modification to the audited model, its training procedure, or its inference pipeline. We provide theoretical guarantees showing that, under this protocol, a provider attempting to hide unfairness must falsify a significantly larger number of responses, thereby increasing both the difficulty and the likelihood of detection of manipulation. Experimental results across representative audit scenarios confirm the effectiveness and practicality of our approach.

Robust ML Auditing using Prior Knowledge

The rapid adoption of ML decision-making systems across products and services has led to a set of regulations on how such systems should behave and be built. Among all the technical challenges to enforcing these regulations, one crucial, yet under-explored problem is the risk of manipulation while these systems are being audited for fairness. This manipulation occurs when a platform deliberately alters its answers to a regulator to pass an audit without modifying its answers to other users. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to manipulation-proof auditing by taking into account the auditor's prior knowledge of the task solved by the platform. We first demonstrate that regulators must not rely on public priors (e.g. a public dataset), as platforms could easily fool the auditor in such cases. We then formally establish the conditions under which an auditor can prevent audit manipulations using prior knowledge about the ground truth. Finally, our experiments with two standard datasets exemplify the maximum level of unfairness a platform can hide before being detected as malicious. Our formalization and generalization of manipulation-proof auditing with a prior opens up new research directions for more robust fairness audits.

Queries, Representation & Detection: The Next 100 Model Fingerprinting Schemes

The deployment of machine learning models in operational contexts represents a significant investment for any organisation. Consequently, the risk of these models being misappropriated by competitors needs to be addressed. In recent years, numerous proposals have been put forth to detect instances of model stealing. However, these proposals operate under implicit and disparate data and model access assumptions; as a consequence, it remains unclear how they can be effectively compared to one another. Our evaluation shows that a simple baseline that we introduce performs on par with existing state-of-the-art fingerprints, which, on the other hand, are much more complex. To uncover the reasons behind this intriguing result, this paper introduces a systematic approach to both the creation of model fingerprinting schemes and their evaluation benchmarks. By dividing model fingerprinting into three core components -- Query, Representation and Detection (QuRD) -- we are able to identify $\sim100$ previously unexplored QuRD combinations and gain insights into their performance. Finally, we introduce a set of metrics to compare and guide the creation of more representative model stealing detection benchmarks. Our approach reveals the need for more challenging benchmarks and a sound comparison with baselines. To foster the creation of new fingerprinting schemes and benchmarks, we open-source our fingerprinting toolbox.

Under manipulations, are some AI models harder to audit?

Auditors need robust methods to assess the compliance of web platforms with the law. However, since they hardly ever have access to the algorithm, implementation, or training data used by a platform, the problem is harder than a simple metric estimation. Within the recent framework of manipulation-proof auditing, we study in this paper the feasibility of robust audits in realistic settings, in which models exhibit large capacities. We first prove a constraining result: if a web platform uses models that may fit any data, no audit strategy -- whether active or not -- can outperform random sampling when estimating properties such as demographic parity. To better understand the conditions under which state-of-the-art auditing techniques may remain competitive, we then relate the manipulability of audits to the capacity of the targeted models, using the Rademacher complexity. We empirically validate these results on popular models of increasing capacities, thus confirming experimentally that large-capacity models, which are commonly used in practice, are particularly hard to audit robustly. These results refine the limits of the auditing problem, and open up enticing questions on the connection between model capacity and the ability of platforms to manipulate audit attempts.