Future Lens: Anticipating Subsequent Tokens from a Single Hidden State

We conjecture that hidden state vectors corresponding to individual input tokens encode information sufficient to accurately predict several tokens ahead. More concretely, in this paper we ask: Given a hidden (internal) representation of a single token at position $t$ in an input, can we reliably anticipate the tokens that will appear at positions $\geq t + 2$? To test this, we measure linear approximation and causal intervention methods in GPT-J-6B to evaluate the degree to which individual hidden states in the network contain signal rich enough to predict future hidden states and, ultimately, token outputs. We find that, at some layers, we can approximate a model's output with more than 48% accuracy with respect to its prediction of subsequent tokens through a single hidden state. Finally we present a "Future Lens" visualization that uses these methods to create a new view of transformer states.

Dropout Attacks

Dropout is a common operator in deep learning, aiming to prevent overfitting by randomly dropping neurons during training. This paper introduces a new family of poisoning attacks against neural networks named DROPOUTATTACK. DROPOUTATTACK attacks the dropout operator by manipulating the selection of neurons to drop instead of selecting them uniformly at random. We design, implement, and evaluate four DROPOUTATTACK variants that cover a broad range of scenarios. These attacks can slow or stop training, destroy prediction accuracy of target classes, and sabotage either precision or recall of a target class. In our experiments of training a VGG-16 model on CIFAR-100, our attack can reduce the precision of the victim class by 34.6% (from 81.7% to 47.1%) without incurring any degradation in model accuracy

Tight Lower Bounds on Worst-Case Guarantees for Zero-Shot Learning with Attributes

We develop a rigorous mathematical analysis of zero-shot learning with attributes. In this setting, the goal is to label novel classes with no training data, only detectors for attributes and a description of how those attributes are correlated with the target classes, called the class-attribute matrix. We develop the first non-trivial lower bound on the worst-case error of the best map from attributes to classes for this setting, even with perfect attribute detectors. The lower bound characterizes the theoretical intrinsic difficulty of the zero-shot problem based on the available information -- the class-attribute matrix -- and the bound is practically computable from it. Our lower bound is tight, as we show that we can always find a randomized map from attributes to classes whose expected error is upper bounded by the value of the lower bound. We show that our analysis can be predictive of how standard zero-shot methods behave in practice, including which classes will likely be confused with others.