Operator learning provides methods to approximate mappings between infinite-dimensional function spaces. Deep operator networks (DeepONets) are a notable architecture in this field. Recently, an extension of DeepONet based on model reduction and neural networks, proper orthogonal decomposition (POD)-DeepONet, has been able to outperform other architectures in terms of accuracy for several benchmark tests. We extend this idea towards nonlinear model order reduction by proposing an efficient framework that combines neural networks with kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) for operator learning. Our results demonstrate the superior performance of KPCA-DeepONet over POD-DeepONet.
Automated driving systems can be helpful in a wide range of societal challenges, e.g., mobility-on-demand and transportation logistics for last-mile delivery, by aiding the vehicle driver or taking over the responsibility for the dynamic driving task partially or completely. Ensuring the safety of automated driving systems is no trivial task, even more so for those systems of SAE Level 3 or above. To achieve this, mechanisms are needed that can continuously monitor the system's operating conditions, also denoted as the system's operational design domain. This paper presents a safety concept for automated driving systems which uses a combination of onboard runtime monitoring via connected dependability cage and off-board runtime monitoring via a remote command control center, to continuously monitor the system's ODD. On one side, the connected dependability cage fulfills a double functionality: (1) to monitor continuously the operational design domain of the automated driving system, and (2) to transfer the responsibility in a smooth and safe manner between the automated driving system and the off-board remote safety driver, who is present in the remote command control center. On the other side, the remote command control center enables the remote safety driver the monitoring and takeover of the vehicle's control. We evaluate our safety concept for automated driving systems in a lab environment and on a test field track and report on results and lessons learned.
The degradation of sewer pipes poses significant economical, environmental and health concerns. The maintenance of such assets requires structured plans to perform inspections, which are more efficient when structural and environmental features are considered along with the results of previous inspection reports. The development of such plans requires degradation models that can be based on statistical and machine learning methods. This work proposes a methodology to assess their suitability to plan inspections considering three dimensions: accuracy metrics, ability to produce long-term degradation curves and explainability. Results suggest that although ensemble models yield the highest accuracy, they are unable to infer the long-term degradation of the pipes, whereas the Logistic Regression offers a slightly less accurate model that is able to produce consistent degradation curves with a high explainability. A use case is presented to demonstrate this methodology and the efficiency of model-based planning compared to the current inspection plan.
Many autonomous systems, such as driverless taxis, perform safety critical functions. Autonomous systems employ artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, specifically for the environment perception. Engineers cannot completely test or formally verify AI-based autonomous systems. The accuracy of AI-based systems depends on the quality of training data. Thus, novelty detection - identifying data that differ in some respect from the data used for training - becomes a safety measure for system development and operation. In this paper, we propose a new architecture for autoencoder-based semantic novelty detection with two innovations: architectural guidelines for a semantic autoencoder topology and a semantic error calculation as novelty criteria. We demonstrate that such a semantic novelty detection outperforms autoencoder-based novelty detection approaches known from literature by minimizing false negatives.
The recent revolution of intelligent systems made it possible for robots and autonomous systems to work alongside humans, collaborating with them and supporting them in many domains. It is undeniable that this interaction can have huge benefits for humans if it is designed properly. However, collaboration with humans requires a high level of cognition and social capabilities in order to gain humans acceptance. In all-human teams, mutual trust is the engine for successful collaboration. This applies to human-robot collaboration as well. Trust in this interaction controls over- and under-reliance. It can also mitigate some risk. Therefore, an appropriate trust level is essential for this new form of teamwork. Most research in this area has looked at trust of humans in machines, neglecting the mutuality of trust among collaboration partners. In this paper, we propose a trust model that incorporates this mutuality captures trust levels of both the human and the robot in real-time, so that robot can base actions on this, allowing for smoother, more natural interactions. This increases the human autonomy since the human does not need to monitor the robot behavior all the time.
There is an increasing necessity to deploy autonomous systems in highly heterogeneous, dynamic environments, e.g. service robots in hospitals or autonomous cars on highways. Due to the uncertainty in these environments, the verification results obtained with respect to the system and environment models at design-time might not be transferable to the system behavior at run time. For autonomous systems operating in dynamic environments, safety of motion and collision avoidance are critical requirements. With regard to these requirements, Macek et al. [6] define the passive safety property, which requires that no collision can occur while the autonomous system is moving. To verify this property, we adopt a two phase process which combines static verification methods, used at design time, with dynamic ones, used at run time. In the design phase, we exploit UPPAAL to formalize the autonomous system and its environment as timed automata and the safety property as TCTL formula and to verify the correctness of these models with respect to this property. For the runtime phase, we build a monitor to check whether the assumptions made at design time are also correct at run time. If the current system observations of the environment do not correspond to the initial system assumptions, the monitor sends feedback to the system and the system enters a passive safe state.