AXE: An Agentic eXploit Engine for Confirming Zero-Day Vulnerability Reports

Vulnerability detection tools are widely adopted in software projects, yet they often overwhelm maintainers with false positives and non-actionable reports. Automated exploitation systems can help validate these reports; however, existing approaches typically operate in isolation from detection pipelines, failing to leverage readily available metadata such as vulnerability type and source-code location. In this paper, we investigate how reported security vulnerabilities can be assessed in a realistic grey-box exploitation setting that leverages minimal vulnerability metadata, specifically a CWE classification and a vulnerable code location. We introduce Agentic eXploit Engine (AXE), a multi-agent framework for Web application exploitation that maps lightweight detection metadata to concrete exploits through decoupled planning, code exploration, and dynamic execution feedback. Evaluated on the CVE-Bench dataset, AXE achieves a 30% exploitation success rate, a 3x improvement over state-of-the-art black-box baselines. Even in a single-agent configuration, grey-box metadata yields a 1.75x performance gain. Systematic error analysis shows that most failed attempts arise from specific reasoning gaps, including misinterpreted vulnerability semantics and unmet execution preconditions. For successful exploits, AXE produces actionable, reproducible proof-of-concept artifacts, demonstrating its utility in streamlining Web vulnerability triage and remediation. We further evaluate AXE's generalizability through a case study on a recent real-world vulnerability not included in CVE-Bench.

Psycholinguistic Analyses in Software Engineering Text: A Systematic Literature Review

Context: A deeper understanding of human factors in software engineering (SE) is essential for improving team collaboration, decision-making, and productivity. Communication channels like code reviews and chats provide insights into developers' psychological and emotional states. While large language models excel at text analysis, they often lack transparency and precision. Psycholinguistic tools like Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) offer clearer, interpretable insights into cognitive and emotional processes exhibited in text. Despite its wide use in SE research, no comprehensive review of LIWC's use has been conducted. Objective: We examine the importance of psycholinguistic tools, particularly LIWC, and provide a thorough analysis of its current and potential future applications in SE research. Methods: We conducted a systematic review of six prominent databases, identifying 43 SE-related papers using LIWC. Our analysis focuses on five research questions. Results: Our findings reveal a wide range of applications, including analyzing team communication to detect developer emotions and personality, developing ML models to predict deleted Stack Overflow posts, and more recently comparing AI-generated and human-written text. LIWC has been primarily used with data from project management platforms (e.g., GitHub) and Q&A forums (e.g., Stack Overflow). Key BSE concepts include Communication, Organizational Climate, and Positive Psychology. 26 of 43 papers did not formally evaluate LIWC. Concerns were raised about some limitations, including difficulty handling SE-specific vocabulary. Conclusion: We highlight the potential of psycholinguistic tools and their limitations, and present new use cases for advancing the research of human factors in SE (e.g., bias in human-LLM conversations).

Do LLMs Consider Security? An Empirical Study on Responses to Programming Questions

The widespread adoption of conversational LLMs for software development has raised new security concerns regarding the safety of LLM-generated content. Our motivational study outlines ChatGPT's potential in volunteering context-specific information to the developers, promoting safe coding practices. Motivated by this finding, we conduct a study to evaluate the degree of security awareness exhibited by three prominent LLMs: Claude 3, GPT-4, and Llama 3. We prompt these LLMs with Stack Overflow questions that contain vulnerable code to evaluate whether they merely provide answers to the questions or if they also warn users about the insecure code, thereby demonstrating a degree of security awareness. Further, we assess whether LLM responses provide information about the causes, exploits, and the potential fixes of the vulnerability, to help raise users' awareness. Our findings show that all three models struggle to accurately detect and warn users about vulnerabilities, achieving a detection rate of only 12.6% to 40% across our datasets. We also observe that the LLMs tend to identify certain types of vulnerabilities related to sensitive information exposure and improper input neutralization much more frequently than other types, such as those involving external control of file names or paths. Furthermore, when LLMs do issue security warnings, they often provide more information on the causes, exploits, and fixes of vulnerabilities compared to Stack Overflow responses. Finally, we provide an in-depth discussion on the implications of our findings and present a CLI-based prompting tool that can be used to generate significantly more secure LLM responses.