The Weaponization of Computer Vision: Tracing Military-Surveillance Ties through Conference Sponsorship

Computer vision, a core domain of artificial intelligence (AI), is the field that enables the computational analysis, understanding, and generation of visual data. Despite being historically rooted in military funding and increasingly deployed in warfare, the field tends to position itself as a neutral, purely technical endeavor, failing to engage in discussions about its dual-use applications. Yet it has been reported that computer vision systems are being systematically weaponized to assist in technologies that inflict harm, such as surveillance or warfare. Expanding on these concerns, we study the extent to which computer vision research is being used in the military and surveillance domains. We do so by collecting a dataset of tech companies with financial ties to the field's central research exchange platform: conferences. Conference sponsorship, we argue, not only serves as strong evidence of a company's investment in the field but also provides a privileged position for shaping its trajectory. By investigating sponsors' activities, we reveal that 44% of them have a direct connection with military or surveillance applications. We extend our analysis through two case studies in which we discuss the opportunities and limitations of sponsorship as a means for uncovering technological weaponization.

Privacy in Image Datasets: A Case Study on Pregnancy Ultrasounds

The rise of generative models has led to increased use of large-scale datasets collected from the internet, often with minimal or no data curation. This raises concerns about the inclusion of sensitive or private information. In this work, we explore the presence of pregnancy ultrasound images, which contain sensitive personal information and are often shared online. Through a systematic examination of LAION-400M dataset using CLIP embedding similarity, we retrieve images containing pregnancy ultrasound and detect thousands of entities of private information such as names and locations. Our findings reveal that multiple images have high-risk information that could enable re-identification or impersonation. We conclude with recommended practices for dataset curation, data privacy, and ethical use of public image datasets.