Playing games with Large language models: Randomness and strategy

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Modelling Opaque Bilateral Market Dynamics in Financial Trading: Insights from a Multi-Agent Simulation Study

Exploring complex adaptive financial trading environments through multi-agent based simulation methods presents an innovative approach within the realm of quantitative finance. Despite the dominance of multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches in financial markets with observable data, there exists a set of systematically significant financial markets that pose challenges due to their partial or obscured data availability. We, therefore, devise a multi-agent simulation approach employing small-scale meta-heuristic methods. This approach aims to represent the opaque bilateral market for Australian government bond trading, capturing the bilateral nature of bank-to-bank trading, also referred to as "over-the-counter" (OTC) trading, and commonly occurring between "market makers". The uniqueness of the bilateral market, characterized by negotiated transactions and a limited number of agents, yields valuable insights for agent-based modelling and quantitative finance. The inherent rigidity of this market structure, which is at odds with the global proliferation of multilateral platforms and the decentralization of finance, underscores the unique insights offered by our agent-based model. We explore the implications of market rigidity on market structure and consider the element of stability, in market design. This extends the ongoing discourse on complex financial trading environments, providing an enhanced understanding of their dynamics and implications.