Security Without Detection: Economic Denial as a Primitive for Edge and IoT Defense

Detection-based security fails against sophisticated attackers using encryption, stealth, and low-rate techniques, particularly in IoT/edge environments where resource constraints preclude ML-based intrusion detection. We present Economic Denial Security (EDS), a detection-independent framework that makes attacks economically infeasible by exploiting a fundamental asymmetry: defenders control their environment while attackers cannot. EDS composes four mechanisms adaptive computational puzzles, decoy-driven interaction entropy, temporal stretching, and bandwidth taxation achieving provably superlinear cost amplification. We formalize EDS as a Stackelberg game, deriving closed-form equilibria for optimal parameter selection (Theorem 1) and proving that mechanism composition yields 2.1x greater costs than the sum of individual mechanisms (Theorem 2). EDS requires < 12KB memory, enabling deployment on ESP32 class microcontrollers. Evaluation on a 20-device heterogeneous IoT testbed across four attack scenarios (n = 30 trials, p < 0.001) demonstrates: 32-560x attack slowdown, 85-520:1 cost asymmetry, 8-62% attack success reduction, < 20ms latency overhead, and close to 0% false positives. Validation against IoT-23 malware (Mirai, Torii, Hajime) shows 88% standalone mitigation; combined with ML-IDS, EDS achieves 94% mitigation versus 67% for IDS alone a 27% improvement. EDS provides detection-independent protection suitable for resource-constrained environments where traditional approaches fail. The ability to detect and mitigate the malware samples tested was enhanced; however, the benefits provided by EDS were realized even without the inclusion of an IDS. Overall, the implementation of EDS serves to shift the economic balance in favor of the defender and provides a viable method to protect IoT and edge systems methodologies.