CharacterFlywheel: Scaling Iterative Improvement of Engaging and Steerable LLMs in Production

This report presents CharacterFlywheel, an iterative flywheel process for improving large language models (LLMs) in production social chat applications across Instagram, WhatsApp, and Messenger. Starting from LLaMA 3.1, we refined models across 15 generations using data from both internal and external real-user traffic. Through continuous deployments from July 2024 to April 2025, we conducted controlled 7-day A/B tests showing consistent engagement improvements: 7 of 8 newly deployed models demonstrated positive lift over the baseline, with the strongest performers achieving up to 8.8% improvement in engagement breadth and 19.4% in engagement depth. We also observed substantial gains in steerability, with instruction following increasing from 59.2% to 84.8% and instruction violations decreasing from 26.6% to 5.8%. We detail the CharacterFlywheel process which integrates data curation, reward modeling to estimate and interpolate the landscape of engagement metrics, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), reinforcement learning (RL), and both offline and online evaluation to ensure reliable progress at each optimization step. We also discuss our methods for overfitting prevention and navigating production dynamics at scale. These contributions advance the scientific rigor and understanding of LLMs in social applications serving millions of users.

Incentivizing High-Quality Human Annotations with Golden Questions

Human-annotated data plays a vital role in training large language models (LLMs), such as supervised fine-tuning and human preference alignment. However, it is not guaranteed that paid human annotators produce high-quality data. In this paper, we study how to incentivize human annotators to do so. We start from a principal-agent model to model the dynamics between the company (the principal) and the annotator (the agent), where the principal can only monitor the annotation quality by examining $n$ samples. We investigate the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) and the corresponding hypothesis testing to incentivize annotators: the agent is given a bonus if the MLE passes the test. By analyzing the variance of the outcome, we show that the strategic behavior of the agent makes the hypothesis testing very different from traditional ones: Unlike the exponential rate proved by the large deviation theory, the principal-agent model's hypothesis testing rate is of $\Theta(1/\sqrt{n \log n})$. Our theory implies two criteria for the \emph{golden questions} to monitor the performance of the annotators: they should be of (1) high certainty and (2) similar format to normal ones. In that light, we select a set of golden questions in human preference data. By doing incentive-compatible experiments, we find out that the annotators' behavior is better revealed by those golden questions, compared to traditional survey techniques such as instructed manipulation checks.

How Humans Help LLMs: Assessing and Incentivizing Human Preference Annotators

Human-annotated preference data play an important role in aligning large language models (LLMs). In this paper, we investigate the questions of assessing the performance of human annotators and incentivizing them to provide high-quality annotations. The quality assessment of language/text annotation faces two challenges: (i) the intrinsic heterogeneity among annotators, which prevents the classic methods that assume the underlying existence of a true label; and (ii) the unclear relationship between the annotation quality and the performance of downstream tasks, which excludes the possibility of inferring the annotators' behavior based on the model performance trained from the annotation data. Then we formulate a principal-agent model to characterize the behaviors of and the interactions between the company and the human annotators. The model rationalizes a practical mechanism of a bonus scheme to incentivize annotators which benefits both parties and it underscores the importance of the joint presence of an assessment system and a proper contract scheme. From a technical perspective, our analysis extends the existing literature on the principal-agent model by considering a continuous action space for the agent. We show the gap between the first-best and the second-best solutions (under the continuous action space) is of $\Theta(1/\sqrt{n \log n})$ for the binary contracts and $\Theta(1/n)$ for the linear contracts, where $n$ is the number of samples used for performance assessment; this contrasts with the known result of $\exp(-\Theta(n))$ for the binary contracts when the action space is discrete. Throughout the paper, we use real preference annotation data to accompany our discussions.