Face morphing attacks present an emerging threat to the face recognition system. On top of that, printing and scanning the morphed images could obscure the artifacts generated during the morphing process, which makes morphed image detection even harder. In this work, we investigate the impact that printing and scanning has on morphing attacks through a series of heterogeneous tests. Our experiments show that we can increase the possibility of a false match by up to 5.64% for DiM and 16.00% for StyleGAN2 when providing an image that has been printed and scanned, regardless it is morphed or bona fide, to a Face Recognition (FR) system. Likewise, using Frechet Inception Distance (FID) metric, strictly print-scanned morph attacks performed on average 9.185% stronger than non-print-scanned digital morphs.
Morphing attacks are an emerging threat to state-of-the-art Face Recognition (FR) systems, which aim to create a single image that contains the biometric information of multiple identities. Diffusion Morphs (DiM) are a recently proposed morphing attack that has achieved state-of-the-art performance for representation-based morphing attacks. However, none of the existing research on DiMs have leveraged the iterative nature of DiMs and left the DiM model as a black box, treating it no differently than one would a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) or Varational AutoEncoder (VAE). We propose a greedy strategy on the iterative sampling process of DiM models which searches for an optimal step guided by an identity-based heuristic function. We compare our proposed algorithm against ten other state-of-the-art morphing algorithms using the open-source SYN-MAD 2022 competition dataset. We find that our proposed algorithm is unreasonably effective, fooling all of the tested FR systems with an MMPMR of 100%, outperforming all other morphing algorithms compared.