Abstract:While Masked Image Modeling (MIM) has revolutionized fields of computer vision, its adoption in 3D medical image computing has been limited by the use of random masking, which overlooks the density of anatomical objects. To address this limitation, we enhance the pretext task with a simple yet effective masking strategy. Leveraging Hounsfield Unit (HU) measurements, we implement an HU-based Foreground Masking, which focuses on the intensity distribution of visceral organs and excludes non-tissue regions, such as air and fluid, that lack diagnostically meaningful features. Extensive experiments on five public 3D medical imaging datasets demonstrate that our masking consistently improves performance, both in quality of segmentation and Dice score (BTCV:~84.64\%, Flare22:~92.43\%, MM-WHS:~90.67\%, Amos22:~88.64\%, BraTS:~78.55\%). These results underscore the importance of domain-centric MIM and suggest a promising direction for representation learning in medical image segmentation. Implementation is available at github.com/AISeedHub/SubFore/.
Abstract:As smartphones become more pervasive, they are increasingly targeted by malware. At the same time, each new generation of smartphone features increasingly powerful onboard sensor suites. A new strain of sensor malware has been developing that leverages these sensors to steal information from the physical environment (e.g., researchers have recently demonstrated how malware can listen for spoken credit card numbers through the microphone, or feel keystroke vibrations using the accelerometer). Yet the possibilities of what malware can see through a camera have been understudied. This paper introduces a novel visual malware called PlaceRaider, which allows remote attackers to engage in remote reconnaissance and what we call virtual theft. Through completely opportunistic use of the camera on the phone and other sensors, PlaceRaider constructs rich, three dimensional models of indoor environments. Remote burglars can thus download the physical space, study the environment carefully, and steal virtual objects from the environment (such as financial documents, information on computer monitors, and personally identifiable information). Through two human subject studies we demonstrate the effectiveness of using mobile devices as powerful surveillance and virtual theft platforms, and we suggest several possible defenses against visual malware.