Abstract:Memristive crossbar arrays (MCA) are emerging as efficient building blocks for in-memory computing and neuromorphic hardware due to their high density and parallel analog matrix-vector multiplication capabilities. However, the physical properties of their nonvolatile memory elements introduce new attack surfaces, particularly under fault injection scenarios. This work explores Laser Fault Injection as a means of inducing analog perturbations in MCA-based architectures. We present a detailed threat model in which adversaries target memristive cells to subtly alter their physical properties or outputs using laser beams. Through HSPICE simulations of a large MCA on 45 nm CMOS tech. node, we show how laser-induced photocurrent manifests in output current distributions, enabling differential fault analysis to infer internal weights with up to 99.7% accuracy, replicate the model, and compromise computational integrity through targeted weight alterations by approximately 143%.
Abstract:Radio frequency fingerprint identification (RFFI) distinguishes wireless devices by the small variations in their analog circuits, avoiding heavy cryptographic authentication. While deep learning on spectrograms improves accuracy, models remain vulnerable to copying, tampering, and evasion. We present a stronger RFFI system combining watermarking for ownership proof and anomaly detection for spotting suspicious inputs. Using a ResNet-34 on log-Mel spectrograms, we embed three watermarks: a simple trigger, an adversarially trained trigger robust to noise and filtering, and a hidden gradient/weight signature. A convolutional Variational Autoencoders (VAE) with Kullback-Leibler (KL) warm-up and free-bits flags off-distribution queries. On the LoRa dataset, our system achieves 94.6% accuracy, 98% watermark success, and 0.94 AUROC, offering verifiable, tamper-resistant authentication.