From Pixels to Reality: Physical-Digital Patch Attacks on Real-World Camera

This demonstration presents Digital-Physical Adversarial Attacks (DiPA), a new class of practical adversarial attacks against pervasive camera-based authentication systems, where an attacker displays an adversarial patch directly on a smartphone screen instead of relying on printed artifacts. This digital-only physical presentation enables rapid deployment, removes the need for total-variation regularization, and improves patch transferability in black-box conditions. DiPA leverages an ensemble of state-of-the-art face-recognition models (ArcFace, MagFace, CosFace) to enhance transfer across unseen commercial systems. Our interactive demo shows a real-time dodging attack against a deployed face-recognition camera, preventing authorized users from being recognized while participants dynamically adjust patch patterns and observe immediate effects on the sensing pipeline. We further demonstrate DiPA's superiority over existing physical attacks in terms of success rate, feature-space distortion, and reductions in detection confidence, highlighting critical vulnerabilities at the intersection of mobile devices, pervasive vision, and sensor-driven authentication infrastructures.

Ti-Patch: Tiled Physical Adversarial Patch for no-reference video quality metrics

Objective no-reference image- and video-quality metrics are crucial in many computer vision tasks. However, state-of-the-art no-reference metrics have become learning-based and are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. The vulnerability of quality metrics imposes restrictions on using such metrics in quality control systems and comparing objective algorithms. Also, using vulnerable metrics as a loss for deep learning model training can mislead training to worsen visual quality. Because of that, quality metrics testing for vulnerability is a task of current interest. This paper proposes a new method for testing quality metrics vulnerability in the physical space. To our knowledge, quality metrics were not previously tested for vulnerability to this attack; they were only tested in the pixel space. We applied a physical adversarial Ti-Patch (Tiled Patch) attack to quality metrics and did experiments both in pixel and physical space. We also performed experiments on the implementation of physical adversarial wallpaper. The proposed method can be used as additional quality metrics in vulnerability evaluation, complementing traditional subjective comparison and vulnerability tests in the pixel space. We made our code and adversarial videos available on GitHub: https://github.com/leonenkova/Ti-Patch.