A Business Model for Resource Sharing in Cell-Free UAVs-Assisted Wireless Networks

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are widely deployed to enhance the wireless network capacity and to provide communication services to mobile users beyond the infrastructure coverage. Recently, with the help of a promising technology called network virtualization, multiple service providers (SPs) can share the infrastructures and wireless resources owned by the mobile network operators (MNOs). Then, they provide specific services to their mobile users using the resources obtained from MNOs. However, wireless resource sharing among SPs is challenging as each SP wants to maximize their utility/profit selfishly while satisfying the QoS requirement of their mobile users. Therefore, in this paper, we propose joint user association and wireless resource sharing problem in the cell-free UAVs-assisted wireless networks with the objective of maximizing the total network utility of the SPs while ensuring QoS constraints of their mobile users and the resource constraints of the UAVs deployed by MNOs. To solve the proposed mixed-integer non-convex problem, we decompose the proposed problem into two subproblems: users association, and resource sharing problems. Then, a two-sided matching algorithm is deployed in order to solve users association problem. We further deploy the whale optimization and Lagrangian relaxation algorithms to solve the resource sharing problem. Finally, extensive numerical results are provided in order to show the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm.

An Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning in Wireless Cellular network: An Auction Approach

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning framework that can deal with the distributed issue in machine learning and still guarantee high learning performance. However, it is impractical that all users will sacrifice their resources to join the FL algorithm. This motivates us to study the incentive mechanism design for FL. In this paper, we consider a FL system that involves one base station (BS) and multiple mobile users. The mobile users use their own data to train the local machine learning model, and then send the trained models to the BS, which generates the initial model, collects local models and constructs the global model. Then, we formulate the incentive mechanism between the BS and mobile users as an auction game where the BS is an auctioneer and the mobile users are the sellers. In the proposed game, each mobile user submits its bids according to the minimal energy cost that the mobile users experiences in participating in FL. To decide winners in the auction and maximize social welfare, we propose the primal-dual greedy auction mechanism. The proposed mechanism can guarantee three economic properties, namely, truthfulness, individual rationality and efficiency. Finally, numerical results are shown to demonstrate the performance effectiveness of our proposed mechanism.