Local search for stable marriage problems with ties and incomplete lists

The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the stable marriage problem, where the men and women express their preferences using a preference list with ties over a subset of the members of the other sex. Matchings are permitted only with people who appear in these preference lists. In this setting, we study the problem of finding a stable matching that marries as many people as possible. Stability is an envy-free notion: no man and woman who are not married to each other would both prefer each other to their partners or to being single. This problem is NP-hard. We tackle this problem using local search, exploiting properties of the problem to reduce the size of the neighborhood and to make local moves efficiently. Experimental results show that this approach is able to solve large problems, quickly returning stable matchings of large and often optimal size.

Online Cake Cutting

We propose an online form of the cake cutting problem. This models situations where players arrive and depart during the process of dividing a resource. We show that well known fair division procedures like cut-and-choose and the Dubins-Spanier moving knife procedure can be adapted to apply to such online problems. We propose some desirable properties that online cake cutting procedures might possess like online forms of proportionality and envy-freeness, and identify which properties are in fact possessed by the different online cake procedures.

Symmetry within and between solutions

Symmetry can be used to help solve many problems. For instance, Einstein's famous 1905 paper ("On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies") uses symmetry to help derive the laws of special relativity. In artificial intelligence, symmetry has played an important role in both problem representation and reasoning. I describe recent work on using symmetry to help solve constraint satisfaction problems. Symmetries occur within individual solutions of problems as well as between different solutions of the same problem. Symmetry can also be applied to the constraints in a problem to give new symmetric constraints. Reasoning about symmetry can speed up problem solving, and has led to the discovery of new results in both graph and number theory.

Decomposition of the NVALUE constraint

We study decompositions of the global NVALUE constraint. Our main contribution is theoretical: we show that there are propagators for global constraints like NVALUE which decomposition can simulate with the same time complexity but with a much greater space complexity. This suggests that the benefit of a global propagator may often not be in saving time but in saving space. Our other theoretical contribution is to show for the first time that range consistency can be enforced on NVALUE with the same worst-case time complexity as bound consistency. Finally, the decompositions we study are readily encoded as linear inequalities. We are therefore able to use them in integer linear programs.

On The Complexity and Completeness of Static Constraints for Breaking Row and Column Symmetry

We consider a common type of symmetry where we have a matrix of decision variables with interchangeable rows and columns. A simple and efficient method to deal with such row and column symmetry is to post symmetry breaking constraints like DOUBLELEX and SNAKELEX. We provide a number of positive and negative results on posting such symmetry breaking constraints. On the positive side, we prove that we can compute in polynomial time a unique representative of an equivalence class in a matrix model with row and column symmetry if the number of rows (or of columns) is bounded and in a number of other special cases. On the negative side, we show that whilst DOUBLELEX and SNAKELEX are often effective in practice, they can leave a large number of symmetric solutions in the worst case. In addition, we prove that propagating DOUBLELEX completely is NP-hard. Finally we consider how to break row, column and value symmetry, correcting a result in the literature about the safeness of combining different symmetry breaking constraints. We end with the first experimental study on how much symmetry is left by DOUBLELEX and SNAKELEX on some benchmark problems.

Symmetries of Symmetry Breaking Constraints

Symmetry is an important feature of many constraint programs. We show that any problem symmetry acting on a set of symmetry breaking constraints can be used to break symmetry. Different symmetries pick out different solutions in each symmetry class. This simple but powerful idea can be used in a number of different ways. We describe one application within model restarts, a search technique designed to reduce the conflict between symmetry breaking and the branching heuristic. In model restarts, we restart search periodically with a random symmetry of the symmetry breaking constraints. Experimental results show that this symmetry breaking technique is effective in practice on some standard benchmark problems.

An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting

Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational complexity. In particular, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. In this paper, we study empirically the manipulability of single transferable voting (STV) to determine if computational complexity is really a barrier to manipulation. STV was one of the first voting rules shown to be NP-hard. It also appears one of the harder voting rules to manipulate. We sample a number of distributions of votes including uniform and real world elections. In almost every election in our experiments, it was easy to compute how a single agent could manipulate the election or to prove that manipulation by a single agent was impossible.

Propagating Conjunctions of AllDifferent Constraints

We study propagation algorithms for the conjunction of two AllDifferent constraints. Solutions of an AllDifferent constraint can be seen as perfect matchings on the variable/value bipartite graph. Therefore, we investigate the problem of finding simultaneous bipartite matchings. We present an extension of the famous Hall theorem which characterizes when simultaneous bipartite matchings exists. Unfortunately, finding such matchings is NP-hard in general. However, we prove a surprising result that finding a simultaneous matching on a convex bipartite graph takes just polynomial time. Based on this theoretical result, we provide the first polynomial time bound consistency algorithm for the conjunction of two AllDifferent constraints. We identify a pathological problem on which this propagator is exponentially faster compared to existing propagators. Our experiments show that this new propagator can offer significant benefits over existing methods.

Symmetry within Solutions

We define the concept of an internal symmetry. This is a symmety within a solution of a constraint satisfaction problem. We compare this to solution symmetry, which is a mapping between different solutions of the same problem. We argue that we may be able to exploit both types of symmetry when finding solutions. We illustrate the potential of exploiting internal symmetries on two benchmark domains: Van der Waerden numbers and graceful graphs. By identifying internal symmetries we are able to extend the state of the art in both cases.

Manipulability of Single Transferable Vote

For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulation. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. We study empirically the cost of manipulating the single transferable vote (STV) rule. This was one of the first rules shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. It also appears to be one of the harder rules to manipulate since it involves multiple rounds and since, unlike many other rules, it is NP-hard for a single agent to manipulate without weights on the votes or uncertainty about how the other agents have voted. In almost every election in our experiments, it was easy to compute how a single agent could manipulate the election or to prove that manipulation by a single agent was impossible. It remains an interesting open question if manipulation by a coalition of agents is hard to compute in practice.