Abstract:Large Language Models (LLMs) are now capable of generating highly fluent, human-like text. They enable many applications, but also raise concerns such as large scale spam, phishing, or academic misuse. While much work has focused on detecting LLM-generated text, only limited work has gone into understanding the stylistic differences between human-written and machine-generated text. In this work, we perform a large scale analysis of stylistic variation across human-written text and outputs from 11 LLMs spanning 8 different genres and 4 decoding strategies using Douglas Biber's set of lexicogrammatical and functional features. Our findings reveal insights that can guide intentional LLM usage. First, key linguistic differentiators of LLM-generated text seem robust to generation conditions (e.g., prompt settings to nudge them to generate human-like text, or availability of human-written text to continue the style); second, genre exerts a stronger influence on stylistic features than the source itself; third, chat variants of the models generally appear to be clustered together in stylistic space, and finally, model has a larger effect on the style than decoding strategy, with some exceptions. These results highlight the relative importance of model and genre over prompting and decoding strategies in shaping the stylistic behavior of machine-generated text.

Abstract:Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, including attacks that leak information about the model's training data. There has recently been an increase in interest about how to best address privacy concerns, especially in the presence of data-removal requests. Machine unlearning algorithms aim to efficiently update trained models to comply with data deletion requests while maintaining performance and without having to resort to retraining the model from scratch, a costly endeavor. Several algorithms in the machine unlearning literature demonstrate some level of privacy gains, but they are often evaluated only on rudimentary membership inference attacks, which do not represent realistic threats. In this paper we describe and propose alternative evaluation methods for three key shortcomings in the current evaluation of unlearning algorithms. We show the utility of our alternative evaluations via a series of experiments of state-of-the-art unlearning algorithms on different computer vision datasets, presenting a more detailed picture of the state of the field.