Abstract:Large language models (LLMs) are often asked whether something is absent from a record, list, or retrieved context. Yet non-observation licenses a negative answer only when evidence completely covers the query scope; otherwise, the answer should remain unknown. We call this completeness-sensitive negative reasoning. We introduce CROWN-QA, comprising CROWN-Synth, a controlled paired core that fixes the question and observed facts while varying only query-relative coverage, and CROWN-Real, a real-document contrast-set evaluation with controlled coverage variants. Across three LLM families, models show unstable closure judgments and substantial over-closure, failing to reliably distinguish a justified negative answer (Certified-Negative) from insufficient evidence (Unknown). The dominant CROWN-Synth failure is asymmetric: models often recognize implicitly complete evidence yet treat implicitly partial evidence as query-covering. Prompting redistributes errors between over- and under-closure rather than consistently resolving them. Structured certificate elicitation traces many errors to evidence-coverage mischaracterization. CROWN-Real shows that the core partial-coverage asymmetry persists on real-document content, while its strength and the balance between over- and under-closure vary by model, prompt, and source.
Abstract:Long-term memory enables persistent personalization in LLM agents, but repeated memory-conditioned responses can cumulatively reveal protected attributes even when they are never stated explicitly. We formalize this threat as adaptive transcript privacy and introduce DP-MemView, a differentially private interface that privately selects public response-conditioning views and exposes those views---rather than raw memory---to the response LLM. Each private selection is charged to every protected attribute whose memory group intersects the read set. Per-attribute ledgers block any selection that would exceed its cap and return a fixed generic view instead. Under an explicit interface contract, we prove pure B_a-DP for the entire adaptive transcript. We also extend the result to stores that differ across multiple protected groups and bound how much observing the transcript can change an adversary's prior odds. We evaluate the online and preallocated modes with three response LLMs on a controlled adjacent-store benchmark and a public-corpus transfer track. Both modes keep transcript distinguishability near chance while preserving target-required personalization and overall response quality. Further diagnostics show that removing key safeguards causes mismatched output support, missing ledger charges, revealing side channels, or growing long-horizon leakage.