Multi-Channel Cross Modal Detection of Synthetic Face Images

Synthetically generated face images have shown to be indistinguishable from real images by humans and as such can lead to a lack of trust in digital content as they can, for instance, be used to spread misinformation. Therefore, the need to develop algorithms for detecting entirely synthetic face images is apparent. Of interest are images generated by state-of-the-art deep learning-based models, as these exhibit a high level of visual realism. Recent works have demonstrated that detecting such synthetic face images under realistic circumstances remains difficult as new and improved generative models are proposed with rapid speed and arbitrary image post-processing can be applied. In this work, we propose a multi-channel architecture for detecting entirely synthetic face images which analyses information both in the frequency and visible spectra using Cross Modal Focal Loss. We compare the proposed architecture with several related architectures trained using Binary Cross Entropy and show in cross-model experiments that the proposed architecture supervised using Cross Modal Focal Loss, in general, achieves most competitive performance.

Attacking Face Recognition with T-shirts: Database, Vulnerability Assessment and Detection

Face recognition systems are widely deployed for biometric authentication. Despite this, it is well-known that, without any safeguards, face recognition systems are highly vulnerable to presentation attacks. In response to this security issue, several promising methods for detecting presentation attacks have been proposed which show high performance on existing benchmarks. However, an ongoing challenge is the generalization of presentation attack detection methods to unseen and new attack types. To this end, we propose a new T-shirt Face Presentation Attack (TFPA) database of 1,608 T-shirt attacks using 100 unique presentation attack instruments. In an extensive evaluation, we show that this type of attack can compromise the security of face recognition systems and that some state-of-the-art attack detection mechanisms trained on popular benchmarks fail to robustly generalize to the new attacks. Further, we propose three new methods for detecting T-shirt attack images, one which relies on the statistical differences between depth maps of bona fide images and T-shirt attacks, an anomaly detection approach trained on features only extracted from bona fide RGB images, and a fusion approach which achieves competitive detection performance.