SCNO: Spiking Compositional Neural Operator -- Towards a Neuromorphic Foundation Model for Nuclear PDE Solving

Neural operators have emerged as powerful surrogates for partial differential equation (PDE) solvers, yet they are typically trained as monolithic models for individual PDEs, require energy-intensive GPU hardware, and must be retrained from scratch when new physics emerge. We introduce the Spiking Compositional Neural Operator (SCNO), a modular architecture combining spiking and conventional components that addresses all three limitations. SCNO maintains a library of small spiking neural operator blocks, each trained on a single elementary differential operator (convection, diffusion, reaction), and composes them through a lightweight input-conditioned aggregator to solve coupled PDEs not seen during block training. A small correction network learns cross-coupling residuals while keeping all blocks and the aggregator frozen, preserving zero-forgetting modular expansion by construction. We evaluate SCNO on eight PDE families including five coupled systems and a nuclear-relevant 1-group neutron diffusion equation. SCNO with correction achieves the lowest relative $L^2$ error on four of five coupled PDEs, outperforming both a monolithic spiking DeepONet (by up to 62%, mean over 3 seeds) and a standard ANN DeepONet (by up to 65%), while requiring only 95K trainable parameters versus 462K for the monolithic baseline. To our knowledge, this is the first compositional spiking neural operator and the first proof-of-concept for modular neuromorphic PDE solving with built-in forgetting-free expansion.

Adversarial Vulnerabilities in Neural Operator Digital Twins: Gradient-Free Attacks on Nuclear Thermal-Hydraulic Surrogates

Operator learning models are rapidly emerging as the predictive core of digital twins for nuclear and energy systems, promising real-time field reconstruction from sparse sensor measurements. Yet their robustness to adversarial perturbations remains uncharacterized, a critical gap for deployment in safety-critical systems. Here we show that neural operators are acutely vulnerable to extremely sparse (fewer than 1% of inputs), physically plausible perturbations that exploit their sensitivity to boundary conditions. Using gradient-free differential evolution across four operator architectures, we demonstrate that minimal modifications trigger catastrophic prediction failures, increasing relative $L_2$ error from $\sim$1.5% (validated accuracy) to 37-63% while remaining completely undetectable by standard validation metrics. Notably, 100% of successful single-point attacks pass z-score anomaly detection. We introduce the effective perturbation dimension $d_{\text{eff}}$, a Jacobian-based diagnostic that, together with sensitivity magnitude, yields a two-factor vulnerability model explaining why architectures with extreme sensitivity concentration (POD-DeepONet, $d_{\text{eff}} \approx 1$) are not necessarily the most exploitable, since low-rank output projections cap maximum error, while moderate concentration with sufficient amplification (S-DeepONet, $d_{\text{eff}} \approx 4$) produces the highest attack success. Gradient-free search outperforms gradient-based alternatives (PGD) on architectures with gradient pathologies, while random perturbations of equal magnitude achieve near-zero success rates, confirming that the discovered vulnerabilities are structural. Our findings expose a previously overlooked attack surface in operator learning models and establish that these models require robustness guarantees beyond standard validation before deployment.