Gray-Box Poisoning of Continuous Malware Ingestion Pipelines

Modern malware detection pipelines rely on continuous data ingestion and machine learning to counter the high volume of novel threats. This work investigates a realistic gray-box poisoning threat model targeting these pipelines. Using the secml_malware framework, we generate problem-space adversarial binaries through functionality-preserving manipulations, specifically Import Address Table (IAT) and section injections. We evaluate the impact of these poisoned samples when ingested into a defender's training set for a LightGBM malware detection model. Our empirical results demonstrate that subtle IAT-based perturbations enable compact poisoning samples that significantly degrade detection recall. These findings illustrate the inherent challenge of developing low-visibility adversarial perturbations that maintain high poisoning efficacy within continuous learning systems. We further evaluate a defense mechanism based on a homogeneous ensemble, which successfully identifies and filters up to 95.6% of poisoning attempts while maintaining a high retention rate for legitimate data. These findings emphasize the necessity of robust pre-ingestion validation in production pipelines.

Adversarial Co-Evolution of Malware and Detection Models: A Bilevel Optimization Perspective

Machine learning-based malware detectors are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial examples. Traditional defenses, such as one-shot adversarial training, often fail against adaptive attackers who use reinforcement learning to bypass detection. This paper proposes a robust defense framework based on bilevel optimization, explicitly modeling the strategic interaction between a defender and an attacker as an adversarial co-evolutionary process. We evaluate our approach using the MAB-malware framework against three distinct malware families: Mokes, Strab, and DCRat. Our experimental results demonstrate that while standard classifiers and basic adversarial retraining often remain vulnerable, showing evasion rates as high as 90 %, the proposed bilevel optimization approach consistently achieves near-total immunity, reducing evasion rates to 0 - 1.89 %. Furthermore, the iterative framework significantly increases the attacker's query complexity, raising the average cost of successful evasion by up to two orders of magnitude. These findings suggest that modeling the iterative cycle of attack and defense through bilevel optimization is essential for developing resilient malware detection systems capable of withstanding evolving adversarial threats.

Classification and Online Clustering of Zero-Day Malware

A large amount of new malware is constantly being generated, which must not only be distinguished from benign samples, but also classified into malware families. For this purpose, investigating how existing malware families are developed and examining emerging families need to be explored. This paper focuses on the online processing of incoming malicious samples to assign them to existing families or, in the case of samples from new families, to cluster them. We experimented with seven prevalent malware families from the EMBER dataset, with four in the training set and three additional new families in the test set. Based on the classification score of the multilayer perceptron, we determined which samples would be classified and which would be clustered into new malware families. We classified 97.21% of streaming data with a balanced accuracy of 95.33%. Then, we clustered the remaining data using a self-organizing map, achieving a purity from 47.61% for four clusters to 77.68% for ten clusters. These results indicate that our approach has the potential to be applied to the classification and clustering of zero-day malware into malware families.