Learning in Repeated Multi-Objective Stackelberg Games with Payoff Manipulation

We study payoff manipulation in repeated multi-objective Stackelberg games, where a leader may strategically influence a follower's deterministic best response, e.g., by offering a share of their own payoff. We assume that the follower's utility function, representing preferences over multiple objectives, is unknown but linear, and its weight parameter must be inferred through interaction. This introduces a sequential decision-making challenge for the leader, who must balance preference elicitation with immediate utility maximisation. We formalise this problem and propose manipulation policies based on expected utility (EU) and long-term expected utility (longEU), which guide the leader in selecting actions and offering incentives that trade off short-term gains with long-term impact. We prove that under infinite repeated interactions, longEU converges to the optimal manipulation. Empirical results across benchmark environments demonstrate that our approach improves cumulative leader utility while promoting mutually beneficial outcomes, all without requiring explicit negotiation or prior knowledge of the follower's utility function.

Identifying the Best Arm in the Presence of Global Environment Shifts

This paper formulates a new Best-Arm Identification problem in the non-stationary stochastic bandits setting, where the means of all arms are shifted in the same way due to a global influence of the environment. The aim is to identify the unique best arm across environmental change given a fixed total budget. While this setting can be regarded as a special case of Adversarial Bandits or Corrupted Bandits, we demonstrate that existing solutions tailored to those settings do not fully utilise the nature of this global influence, and thus, do not work well in practice (despite their theoretical guarantees). To overcome this issue, in this paper we develop a novel selection policy that is consistent and robust in dealing with global environmental shifts. We then propose an allocation policy, LinLUCB, which exploits information about global shifts across all arms in each environment. Empirical tests depict a significant improvement in our policies against other existing methods.