On Transformations between Probability and Spohnian Disbelief Functions

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between probability and Spohn's theory for representation of uncertain beliefs. Using the intuitive idea that the more probable a proposition is, the more believable it is, we study transformations from probability to Sphonian disbelief and vice-versa. The transformations described in this paper are different from those described in the literature. In particular, the former satisfies the principles of ordinal congruence while the latter does not. Such transformations between probability and Spohn's calculi can contribute to (1) a clarification of the semantics of nonprobabilistic degree of uncertain belief, and (2) to a construction of a decision theory for such calculi. In practice, the transformations will allow a meaningful combination of more than one calculus in different stages of using an expert system such as knowledge acquisition, inference, and interpretation of results.

A Qualitative Linear Utility Theory for Spohn's Theory of Epistemic Beliefs

In this paper, we formulate a qualitative "linear" utility theory for lotteries in which uncertainty is expressed qualitatively using a Spohnian disbelief function. We argue that a rational decision maker facing an uncertain decision problem in which the uncertainty is expressed qualitatively should behave so as to maximize "qualitative expected utility." Our axiomatization of the qualitative utility is similar to the axiomatization developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern for probabilistic lotteries. We compare our results with other recent results in qualitative decision making.

A Comparison of Axiomatic Approaches to Qualitative Decision Making Using Possibility Theory

In this paper we analyze two recent axiomatic approaches proposed by Dubois et al and by Giang and Shenoy to qualitative decision making where uncertainty is described by possibility theory. Both axiomtizations are inspired by von Neumann and Morgenstern's system of axioms for the case of probability theory. We show that our approach naturally unifies two axiomatic systems that correspond respectively to pessimistic and optimistic decision criteria proposed by Dubois et al. The simplifying unification is achieved by (i) replacing axioms that are supposed to reflect two informational attitudes (uncertainty aversion and uncertainty attraction) by an axiom that imposes order on set of standard lotteries and (ii) using a binary utility scale in which each utility level is represented by a pair of numbers.

Statistical Decisions Using Likelihood Information Without Prior Probabilities

This paper presents a decision-theoretic approach to statistical inference that satisfies the likelihood principle (LP) without using prior information. Unlike the Bayesian approach, which also satisfies LP, we do not assume knowledge of the prior distribution of the unknown parameter. With respect to information that can be obtained from an experiment, our solution is more efficient than Wald's minimax solution.However, with respect to information assumed to be known before the experiment, our solution demands less input than the Bayesian solution.

Decision Making with Partially Consonant Belief Functions

This paper studies decision making for Walley's partially consonant belief functions (pcb). In a pcb, the set of foci are partitioned. Within each partition, the foci are nested. The pcb class includes probability functions and possibility functions as extreme cases. Unlike earlier proposals for a decision theory with belief functions, we employ an axiomatic approach. We adopt an axiom system similar in spirit to von Neumann - Morgenstern's linear utility theory for a preference relation on pcb lotteries. We prove a representation theorem for this relation. Utility for a pcb lottery is a combination of linear utility for probabilistic lottery and binary utility for possibilistic lottery.

Decision Making for Symbolic Probability

This paper proposes a decision theory for a symbolic generalization of probability theory (SP). Darwiche and Ginsberg [2,3] proposed SP to relax the requirement of using numbers for uncertainty while preserving desirable patterns of Bayesian reasoning. SP represents uncertainty by symbolic supports that are ordered partially rather than completely as in the case of standard probability. We show that a preference relation on acts that satisfies a number of intuitive postulates is represented by a utility function whose domain is a set of pairs of supports. We argue that a subjective interpretation is as useful and appropriate for SP as it is for numerical probability. It is useful because the subjective interpretation provides a basis for uncertainty elicitation. It is appropriate because we can provide a decision theory that explains how preference on acts is based on support comparison.

A new axiomatization for likelihood gambles

This paper studies a new and more general axiomatization than one presented previously for preference on likelihood gambles. Likelihood gambles describe actions in a situation where a decision maker knows multiple probabilistic models and a random sample generated from one of those models but does not know prior probability of models. This new axiom system is inspired by Jensen's axiomatization of probabilistic gambles. Our approach provides a new perspective to the role of data in decision making under ambiguity. It avoids one of the most controversial issue of Bayesian methodology namely the assumption of prior probability.

Dynamic consistency and decision making under vacuous belief

The ideas about decision making under ignorance in economics are combined with the ideas about uncertainty representation in computer science. The combination sheds new light on the question of how artificial agents can act in a dynamically consistent manner. The notion of sequential consistency is formalized by adapting the law of iterated expectation for plausibility measures. The necessary and sufficient condition for a certainty equivalence operator for Nehring-Puppe's preference to be sequentially consistent is given. This result sheds light on the models of decision making under uncertainty.