Combination of Evidence Using the Principle of Minimum Information Gain

One of the most important aspects in any treatment of uncertain information is the rule of combination for updating the degrees of uncertainty. The theory of belief functions uses the Dempster rule to combine two belief functions defined by independent bodies of evidence. However, with limited dependency information about the accumulated belief the Dempster rule may lead to unsatisfactory results. The present study suggests a method to determine the accumulated belief based on the premise that the information gain from the combination process should be minimum. This method provides a mechanism that is equivalent to the Bayes rule when all the conditional probabilities are available and to the Dempster rule when the normalization constant is equal to one. The proposed principle of minimum information gain is shown to be equivalent to the maximum entropy formalism, a special case of the principle of minimum cross-entropy. The application of this principle results in a monotonic increase in belief with accumulation of consistent evidence. The suggested approach may provide a more reasonable criterion for identifying conflicts among various bodies of evidence.

Compatibility of Quantitative and Qualitative Representations of Belief

The compatibility of quantitative and qualitative representations of beliefs was studied extensively in probability theory. It is only recently that this important topic is considered in the context of belief functions. In this paper, the compatibility of various quantitative belief measures and qualitative belief structures is investigated. Four classes of belief measures considered are: the probability function, the monotonic belief function, Shafer's belief function, and Smets' generalized belief function. The analysis of their individual compatibility with different belief structures not only provides a sound b<msis for these quantitative measures, but also alleviates some of the difficulties in the acquisition and interpretation of numeric belief numbers. It is shown that the structure of qualitative probability is compatible with monotonic belief functions. Moreover, a belief structure slightly weaker than that of qualitative belief is compatible with Smets' generalized belief functions.