Optimal Modified Feedback Strategies in LQ Games under Control Imperfections

Game-theoretic approaches and Nash equilibrium have been widely applied across various engineering domains. However, practical challenges such as disturbances, delays, and actuator limitations can hinder the precise execution of Nash equilibrium strategies. This work explores the impact of such implementation imperfections on game trajectories and players' costs within the context of a two-player linear quadratic (LQ) nonzero-sum game. Specifically, we analyze how small deviations by one player affect the state and cost function of the other player. To address these deviations, we propose an adjusted control policy that not only mitigates adverse effects optimally but can also exploit the deviations to enhance performance. Rigorous mathematical analysis and proofs are presented, demonstrating through a representative example that the proposed policy modification achieves up to $61\%$ improvement compared to the unadjusted feedback policy and up to $0.59\%$ compared to the feedback Nash strategy.